bd 


r 

1568 

yi3 


VI 


SPEECH 


OF  NEW  YORK, 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 


ON  THF, 


MISSION    TO    PANAMA. 


MARCH,    1826. 


> 


PRINTED    BY    GALES    &    SEATON, 

1826. 


Bancroft  Library 
77,233 


The  following  Resolution,  reported  by  the  Committee  of  Foreign 
Relations,  being  under  consideration,  viz: 

"  Resolved,  That  it  is  not  expedient  at  this  time,  for  the  United  States  to  send  anf 
Ministers  to  the  Congress  of  American  Nations,  assembled  at  Panama" — 

MR.  VAN  BUREN,  of  New  York,  addressed  the  Senate,  in  sub 
stance,  as  follows : — 

It  is  with  great  reluctance,  Mr.  President,  that  I  rise  to  address 
you.  The  cause  of  that  reluctance  shill  be  stated  with  frankness, 
but  without  asperity.  I  entertain  no  feelings  but  those  of  perfect 
liberality  towards  gentlemen  with  whom  it  is  my  misfortune  to 
differ.  Claiming  for  myself  an  entire  freedom  of  opinion,  I  yield 
it  cheerfully  to  them.  With  their  motives  t  do  not  interfere. 
That  they  are  pure  no  one  will  question.  But,  against  the  course 
pursued  by  the  advocates  of  the  mission,  I  do  object.  It  is  my 
right  to  do  so ;  a  right  which  I  shall  exercise  freely,  but  respect 
fully. 

The  subject  before  us  presents  a  question  entirely  new.  It  is 
one,  too,  of  intense  interest,  involving  considerations  which,  when 
once  fully  understood,  cannot  fail  to  excite  the  deep  solicitude  of 
our  constituents,  and  ought  to  fill  us  with  proportionate  anxiety. 
It  has  grieved  me  to  hear  it  announced,  on  different  occasions, 
and  in  various  forms,  that  gentlemen  had  so  definitively  made 
up  their  minds  as  to  render  discussion  unavailing.  I  venture  to 
affirm,  that  a  similar  course  has  never  been  pursued  in  a  deli 
berative  assembly.  Cases  have  occurred  where  the  sinister  de 
signs  of  a  factious  minority  have  been  defeated  by  a  refusal  to 
reply-  to  speeches  made  after  a  subject  had  been  fully  discussed, 
and  with  the  sole  view  of  embarrassing  the  operations  of  Govern 
ment  ;  but  to  commence  the  consideration  of  a  great  national 
measure  with  the  declaration,  on  the  part  of  its  advocates,  that  it 
ought  to  be  settled  by  a  silent  vote,  is  an  occurrence,  in  the  an 
nals  of  legislation,  which,  as  it  now  stands  without  precedent,  will 
remain,  I  trust,  forever,  without  imitation 

It  is  not  for  me  to  advise  those  with  whom  I  differ  in  opinion  : 
nor  am  1  disposed  to  arrogate  a  privilege  to  which  I  have  no 
claim.  I  will,  however,  with  permission,  and  in  all  kindness,  in* 


treat  gentlemen  to  reconsider  the  propriety  of  a  course  which  can 
not,  I  atn  persuaded,  receive  the  sanction  of  their  deliberate  judg 
ments.  Let  each  determine/or  himself  whether  it  will  read  well 
in  the  history  of  this  measure,  that  its  progress  through  this  House 
has  been  marked  by  a  circumstance  of  so  extraordinary  a  charac 
ter.  Entertaining  an  entire  confidence  in  the  motives  of  gentle 
men,  I  will  still  encourage  the  hope,  that  they  will  diffuse  the  light 
which  has  brought  conviction  to  their  minds;  and, as  far  as  practi 
cable,  divest  themselves  of  all  predetermination.  This  hope  alone 
induces  me  to  trespass,  for  a  moment,  on  the  time  of  the  Senate. 

Nothing  can  contribute  more  to  a  just  decision  of  the  question 
before  us,  than  a  correct  understanding  of  what  that  question  is. 
I  will  endeavor  to  state  it. 

A  Congress  of  deputies  from  several  of  the  Spanish  American 
States,  is  to  be  held  at  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  objects, 
powers,  and  duties  of  the  Congress,  are  set  forth  in  certain  treaties, 
formed  by  those  of  whom  the  Congress  will  be  composed. 

The  United  States  were  not  parties  to  these  Treaties,  but,  sub 
sequently  to  their  formation,  it  was  thought  advisable,  by  some  of 
the  States,  to  invite  us  to  join  them.  Foreseeing  the  difficulties 
which  might  prevent  an  acceptance  of  their  invitation,  and  unwil 
ling  to  impose  the  necessity  of  a  refusal,  these  States,  with  a  com 
mendable  delicacy,  made  an  informal  application  to  our  Govern 
ment  to  know  if  it  would  be  agreeable  to  it,  that  such  an  invita 
tion  should  be  given.  On  receiving  this  intimation,  the  President 
had  before  him  the  choice  of  one  of  several  courses.  If  he  believed 
that  the  attendance  of  an  authorized  Agent  of  the  United  States  at 
Panama,  with  suitable  instructions,  would  be  beneficial,  it  was 
competent  for  him  to  have  sent  a  private  agent,  at  the  public  ex 
pense,  with  proper  credentials.  If  he  had  thought  it  more  advisa 
ble,  because  more  respectful,  he  might  have  directed  our  Ministers 
at  Colombia  and  Mexico,  or  either  of  them,  to  repair  to  the  pro 
posed  seat  of  the  Congress,  instructed  to  express  the  interest  we 
take  in  the  success  and  prosperity  of  the  States  there  assembled, 
to  explain  to  thcmi  the  principles  of  our  policy,  and  the  reasons 
which  dissuaded  our  Government  from  uniting  in  the  Congress, 
and  to  communicate  whatever  else,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Executive, 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  required.  Or  he  might  have  ex 
pressed  his  desire,  that  the  invitation  to  the  United  States,  to  be 
represented  in  the  proposed  Congress,  should  be  given,  and,  as  far 
as  his  constitutional  power  extended,  determined  to  accept  it.  He 
has  chosen  the  latter:  and  if  the  Senate  approve,  and  Congress 
make  the  necessary  appropriation,  his  decision  will  of  course  su 
persede  any  other  steps  which  might  have  been  taken.  But,  if  the 
Senate  do  not  approve,  or  Congress  refuse  the  appropriation,  either 
of  the  other  measures  may  still  be  adopted.  Their  execution  is 


within  the  constitutional  competency  of  the  Executive,  and  the 
contingent  fund  will  supply  the  means.  It  will  be  seen,  therefore, 
that  the  question  is  not  whether  measures  shall  be  taken  to  avail 
ourselves  of  all  attainable  advantages  from  the  assembly  of  the 
Spanish  American  States,  but  whether  they  shall  be  of  the  charac 
ter,  and  in  the  form  proposed.  That  form  is,  to  send  a  represen 
tation,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  to  the  Congress  of  Panama, 
according  to  the  invitation  given  to  our  Government,  and  its  con 
ditional  acceptance.  1  cannot  give  my  advice  and  consent  to  this 
measure  ;  and,  in  assigning  the  reasons  for  my  dissent,  I  hope  to 
be  excused  for  omitting  to  notice  some  of  the  topics  so  largely 
dwelt  on,  in  former  debates,  on  the  subject  of  Spanish  American 
Affairs:  such  as  the  geographical  description  and  great  extent  of 
these  States,  the  character  of  their  inhabitants,  moral,  physical, 
and  intellectual,  the  injustice  of  their  first  enslavement,  the  odious 
tyranny  practised  upon  them  for  a  succession  of  ages,  and  the  cru 
elties  inflicted  by  their  unnatural  mother  during  the  war  of  inde 
pendence.  Subjects  which,  although  they  may  at  times,  have  pro 
duced  some  of  the  finest  effusions  of  genuine  patriotism,  have  also 
nut  unfrequently  been  the  theme  of  wild  and  enthusiastic,  not  to 
say  frothy  and  unprofitable  declamation.  We  have  had  enough 
of  such  essays. 

I  will  not  say  that  they  have  become  stale,  because  I  would  not 
so  speak  of  any  honest  efforts  in  the  cause  of  public  liberty.  For 
the  present,  at  least,  they  would  be  misdirected.  The  condition 
of  things  is  changed.  Affairs  have  advanced.  The  colonies,  whose 
distressed  condition  has  occasioned  these  strong  appeals  to  our 
sympathies,  are  now  of  right,  and  in  fact,  free  and  sovereign  States. 
Their  independence  has  been  deliberately  recognized  by  us  and 
other  Powers,  in  the  face  of  the  world  ;  and,  though  not  yet  ac 
knowledged  by  Spain,  (or  likely  soon  to  be,)  is  held  by  as  good  a 
tenure,  and  stands,  I  hope,  upon  as  firm  a  basis,  as  our  own.  They 
have  severed  the  tie  which  bound  them  to  the  mother  country ; 
and,  unlike  ourselves,  have  achieved  their  liberation  by  their  own, 
unaided,  efforts.  As  they  have  thus  won  an  honorable  station 
among  independent  States,  it  becomes  our  imperative  duty  to  treat 
with  them  as  such.  In  our  intercourse  with  them,  as  with  all,  it 
should  be  our  first  and  highest  concern  to  guard,  with  anxious  so 
licitude,  the  peace  and  happiness  of  our  own  country  ;  and,  in  the 
fulfilment  of  this  duty,  to  reject  every  measure,  however  dazzling, 
which  can  have  a  tendency  to  put  these  great  interests  at  hazard. 
Whether  the  measure,  now  proposed,  will  endanger  those  interests, 
or  whether  there  is  not  reasonable  ground  to  apprehend  it,  is  the 
question.  To  this  will  my  observations  be  directed,  alike  regard 
less  of  all  extraneous  excitement,  and  indifferent  to  the  unmerited 
suspicion  of  being  lukewarm  in  the  cause  of  South  American  liberty. 


The  first  points  which  naturally  present  themselves  for  our  con 
sideration,  are  the  character  of  the  Congress,  and  the  limitations 
under  which  it  is  proposed  that  the  United  States  should  become 
a  party.  In  the  former  are  embraced  the  objects  of  the  assembly, 
present  and  future  ;  the  powers  of  the  deputies;  its  duration,  whe 
ther  temporary  or  permanent ;  and  its  manner  of  acting,  whether 
legislative  or  diplomatic.  In  the  latter  are  embraced  the  portion 
of  the  concerns  of  the  Congress,  in  which  the  United  States  are 
invited  to  participate,  and  the  manner  of  that  participation.  Upon 
some,  if  not  all  these  points,  it  must  be  admitted,  we  are  without 
satisfactory  information.  But  the  fault,  if  fault  there  be,  in  this 
particular,  does  not  lie  at  our  door,  There  was  a  time  when  the 
Executive  required,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  acceptance  of 
the  invitation,  an  adjustment  of  several  preliminary  points,  such 
as  "  the  subject  to  which  the  attention  of  Congress  was  to  be 
"directed  ;  the  nature  and  form  of  the  powers  to  be  given  to  the 
diplomatic  agents  who  were  "  to  compose  it;  and  the  mode  of 
its  organization  and  action."  But  that  condition  was  after 
wards,  and  I  cannot  but  think  improvidently,  dispensed  with. 
When  this  subject  was  first  laid  before  us,  we  were  furnished 
with  no  evidence,  upon  some  of  the  points  referred  to,  except 
the  little  that  could  be  gleaned  from  the  letters  of  invitation* 
It  was  not  until  the  10th  of  January,  in  compliance  with  the 
call  of  the  Senate,  of  the  4th,  that  the  treaties,  in  virtue  of 
which  the  Congress  is  to  be  held,  were  sent  to  us.  Sir,  the  in 
roads  which  the  insinuating,  not  to  say  insidious,  influence  of  Execu 
tive  authority  has  made  upon  the  rights  and  privileges  of  this  body, 
from  which  so  much  was  expected  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  are  great  indeed.  This  remark  is  not  made  with  particular 
reference  to  the  present  Executive.  The  history  of  our  Govern 
ment,  for  many  years,  presents  an  unbroken  series  of  similar  en 
croachments.  The  relation  in  which  the  President  stands  to  the 
Senate,  when  acting  under  the  treaty-making  power,  is  essentially 
different  from  the  other  relations  prescribed  by  the  Constitution, 
He  has  Executive  duties  to  discharge,  in  which  the  legislature  have 
no  participation,  duties  which  ordinarily  commence  when  theirs  have 
terminated.  Information,  in  his  possession,  relating  to  that  branch 
of  his  public  duties,  it  is  his  right  to  communicate  or  withhold  from 
Congress,  as,  in  his  opinion,  may  best  subserve  the  public  interest. 
By  the  Constitution,  also,  the  exclusive  right  of  nomination  to  of 
fice  is  given  to  him,  and  the  Senate  are  called  on,  only,  to  approve 
or  disapprove.  There,  too,  he  acts  distinct  from  us,  and  possesses 
a  discretion,  though,  perhaps,  more  limited,  with  regard  to  the  com 
munication  of  information.  But  on  the  subject  of  treaties,  the  case 
is  evidently  different.  They  are  to  be  made  "by  and  with  the  ad 
vice  and  consent  of  the  Senate."  Upon  that  subject,  every  step, 
preliminary  as  well  as  final, ought,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution, 


to  be  submitted  to  the  Senate.  The  practice  of  conceding  to  the 
Executive  the  preliminary  steps  in  a  negotiation,  first  adopted  from, 
convenience,  and  since  acquiesced  in  from  habit,  is  now  consider 
ed  by  some  as  an  unquestioned  right.  But  in  the  early  adminis 
tration  of  the  Government  it  was  different.  General  Washington, 
pursuing  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  before  commencing  any 
new  negotiation,  laid  before  the  Senate  the  views  of  the  Executive, 
the  instructions  proposed  to  be  given  to  ministers,  and  all  the  in 
formation  in  his  possession,  and  then  asked  the  benefit  of  their 
counsel.  He  appears  to  have  thought  that  information  necessary 
to  both  should  be  viewed  in  all  respects  as  the  common  property  of 
both.  But  now,  instead  of  those  full  and  explicit  communications, 
a  portion,  only,  of  the  requisite  information  is  sparingly  doled  out — 
just  enough  to  satisfy  the  successive  calls  of  the  Senate  ;  calls  al 
ways  made  with  reluctance,  because  considered  by  some  as  imply 
ing  r.n  unwillingness  to  communicate  what  may  be  desired.  It  will 
be  recollected,  that  it  was  not  until  the  2d  of  February,  that  the 
Senate  obtained  the  information  upon  which  it  consented  to  act. 
It  is  not  my  intention  to  impute  to  the  Executive  a  disposition  to 
suppress  any  thing  connected  with  this  subject.  I  have  no  reason 
to  believe  that  these  views  exist.  It  is  to  the  practice  itself  which  he 
found  on  entering  into  office,  that  I  have  deemed  this  a  proper  op 
portunity  to  object,  not  without  a  hope  that  a  remedy  may  be  ap 
plied.  It  is  known  to  every  member  of  the  S;  nate  that,  from  this 
cause  on  the  subject  before  us,  its  deliberations  have  been  embar 
rassed,  and  its  action  impeded. 

Hoping  to  be  excused  from  a  digression  not  wholly  irrelevant,  I 
shall  proceed  to  the  discussion  of  the  subject. 

What  is  the  character  of  the  Congress  of  Panama,  first,  as  it 
respects  the  Spanish  American  States,  by  whom  it  is  constituted, 
and  secondly,  the  footing  on  which  our  Representatives  are  to  stand. 
Is  it  to  be,  as  asserted  by  the  gentleman  from  Rhode  Island,  a  mere 
diplomatic  council,  held  for  convenience  in  negotiation,  with  power 
to  make  and  receive  proposals,  but  without  authority  to  bind  the 
represented  States?*  or  is  it  to  be  an  efficient  public  body,  the  per 
manent  organ  of  a  confederation  of  free  States,  formed  for  great 
national  purposes  ?  In  short,  is  it  to  be  an  adcising  or  an  acting 
body  ? 

The  Treaties  between  the  Republics  of  Colombia  and  those 
of  Peru,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  Guatemala,  formed  in  the  years  1822, 


•  Tne  President,  in  his  Lite  Message  to  the  House  of  Representatives, 
adopts  a  similar  construction  of  the  Treaty.  His  opinion  is  founded  on  the 
matttr  here  discussed,  and  upon  nothing  else.  The  question  remains:  Is 
that  construction  the  true  one?  Does  il  comport  w>t>.  the  views  and  inten 
tions  of  he  Spanish  American  States,  who  have  instituted  the  Congress?  U 
is  respectfully  contended  that  it  does  not. 


?23,  and  ?25,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  institution  and  character 
of  the  Congress,  are  alike.  By  these  Treaties,  a  permanent  League 
and  Confederation,  in  peace  and  war.  is  established  among  the  par 
ties:  containing  guarantees  of  the  Territories  of  the  respective 
States,  and  stipulating  for  contributions  in  ships,  men,  and  money, 
for  the  common  defence.  In  a  word,  they  provide  for  the  union 
and  application  of  their  joint  means,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting 
the  general  good  of  the  Confederate  States,  reserving  to  each  its 
sovereignty  in  whatever  relates  to  its  internal  concerns,  and  cer 
tain  portions  of  its  foreign  relations.  The  second,  third,  and  fourth 
articles  of  the  Treaty  between  Colombia  and  Chile,  are  in  the  fol 
lowing  words: 

"ART.  1.  The  Republic  of  Colombia  and  the  State  of  Chile  are 

"united,  bound,  and  confederated,  in  peace  and  ivar,  to  maintain 

'  with  their  influences  and  forces,  by  sea  and  land,  as  far  as  cir- 

'cumstances  permit,  their  independence  of  the  Spanish  nation, 

*  and  of  any  olher  foreign  domination  whatever;  and  to  secure,  after 

'that  is  recognized,  their  mutual  prosperity,  the  greatest  harmony 

'and  good  understanding,  as  well  between  their  people,  subjects, 

'and  citizens,  as  with  other  Powers  with  which  they  may  enter 

"  into  relations. 

"ART.  2.  The  Republic  of  Colombia,  and  the  State  of  Chile, 
**  therefore,  voluntarily  promise  and  contract  a  League  of  close 
"alliance  and  constant  friendship,  for  the  common  defenre,  for  the 
"security  of  their  independence  and  liberty,  for  their  reciprocal 
"and  general  good,  obliging  themselves  to  succor  each  other, 
"and  repd,  in  common,  every  attack  or  invasion  which  may,  in 
"any  manner,  threaten  their  political  existence. 

"  ART.  3.  In  order  to  contribute  to  the  objects  pointed  out  in 
"the  foregoing  articles,  the  Republic  of  Colombia  binds  itself  to 
"  assist,  with  the  disposable  sea  and  land  forces,  of  which  the  num- 
"ber,  or  its  equivalent,  shall  be  fixed  at  a  meeting  of  Pleni 
potentiaries. 

"ART.  4.  The  State  of  Chile  shall  also  contribute  with  the  dis- 
"posabie  sea  and  land  forces,  of  which  the  number,  or  its  equiva 
lent,  shall  likewise  be  fixed  at  said  meeting." 

The  other  Treaties  contain  stipulations  of  similar  import.  For 
the  Confederation  thus  formed,  a  National  Council  is  provided, 
composed  of  two  deputies  from  each  of  the  Confederate  States: 
they  are  to  meet  at  Panama;  but  if  ever,  from  the  accidents  of 
war,  or  for  any  other  reason,  that  should  be  deemed  an  improper 
place,  a  majority  of  the  States  may  remove  it  to  some  other  spot 
in  Spanish  America.  Its  objects  and  powers  are  thus  stated  in  all 
the  Treaties  :  "A  General  Congress  shall  be  assembled,  composed 
"  of  Plenipotentiaries  from  the  American  States,  for  the  purpose 


9 

"of  establishing  on  a  more  solid  basis,  the  intimate  relations  which 
"should  exist  between  them  all,  individually  and  collectively  :  and 
"  that  it  may  serve  as  a  Council  in  great  events,  as  a  point  of  union 
"in  common  danger,  as  a  faithful  interpreter  of  public  Treaties, 
"  in  cases  of  misunderstanding,  and  as  an  arbitrator  and  conciliator 
"  of  disputes  and  differences." 

Now,  for  the  purpose  of  simplifying  the  question,  permit  me  to 
ask,  can  the  two  specific  objects  and  duties  of  the  Congress,  viz: 
the  interpretation  of  treaties,  and  the  umpirage  of  all  disputes  and 
differences  between  the  confederate  States,  be  effected  upon  the 
limited  construction  now  for  the  first  time  given  to  its  powers  5  a 
construction  resorted  to,  and  enforced  with  much  ingenuity,  by 
the  gentleman  from  Rhode  Island,  when  the  dangerous  steps  we 
are  about  to  take  are  fully  presented  to  his  view.  Upon  further 
reflection,  that  gentleman  cannot  fail  to  detect  the  fallacy  of  the 
reasoning,  by  which  he  has  been  induced  to  adopt  a  construction 
against  the  express  letter  of  the  treaties.  He  asks — where  are  the 
powers  by  which  the  Congress  is  to  enforce  its  decisions  ;  none 
are  given ;  hence  he  infers,  that  they  are  only  authorized  to  ad 
vise,  but  not  to  direct.  Permit  me  to  ask  the  worthy  gentleman 
to  define  the  character  of  our  Congress  under  the  Articles  of  Con 
federation.  Was  that  a  mere  diplomatic  council — an  advising 
power — a  convention  of  Diplomatists  met  to  negotiate,  but  not  to 
decide  ?  It  was  a  legislative  body,  acting  to  the  extent  of  the 
powers  conferred.  If  the  gentleman  will  compare  the  treaties  by 
which  the  Congress  of  Panama  is  established,  with  our  Articles  of 
Confederation,  he  will  perceive  a  striking  similarity  between  them. 
Our  "  Congress  was  declared  to  be  the  last  resort  "or  appeal  for  all 
"  disputes  or  differences  now  subsisting,  or  that  may  hereafter 
"arise,  between  two  or  more  States,  concerning  boundary,  juris- 
"  diction,  or  any  other  cause  whatever."  Was  any  direct  power 
conferred  to  enforce  its  decisions  ?  Not  at  all.  That  Congress 
was  left,  as  the  Congress  of  Spanish  American  States  is  left,  to 
the  obligations  resting  on  each  of  the  confederate  States,  to  abide 
by  the  decisons  of  a  tribunal  of  their  own  creation,  and  to  the  known 
consequences  of  contumacy.  Our  Congress,  it  is  true,  had  the 
express  power  to  decide  on  peace  or  war.  But  was  it  clothed 
with  the  means  of  sustaining  their  decision  ?  Was  it  not  wholly 
dependent  on  the  voluntary  contributions  of  the  States  ?  The 
gentleman  also  refers  to  the  stipulation  contained  in  the  treaties, 
securing  (i  the  exercise  of  the  national  sovereignty  of  each  of  the 
"  contracting  parties,  as  well  as  to  what  regards  their  laws,  and 
"  to  the  establishment  and  form  of  their  respective  Governments," 
&c.  &c.  By  adverting  to  the  Articles  ef  our  Confederation,  he 
will  again  find  a  stipulation  "  that  each  State  should  retain  its 
sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence,  and  every  power,  juris- 
2 


10 

diction,  and  right,"  which  was  not  expressly  delegated  to  the 
United  States,     But  if  he  be  correct  in  supposing  that  this  Con- 
gress  will  be  a  mere  diplomatic  meeting,  for  the  purpose  of  nego 
tiating  treaties  in  the  usual  form,  and  without  power  to  bind  any 
State  except  by  its  own  consent,  whence   the  necessity  of  this 
reservation  ?    Does  he  not  perceive  that  the  very  fact  of  inserting 
the  exception,  on  which  he  so  confidently  relies,  overthrows  the 
argument  he  attempts  to  sustain  by  it  ?      It  can  require  no  argu 
ment,  or  elucidation,  to  establish  the  permanent  character  of  the 
Congress ;  it  has  no  limitation  as  to  time  in  the  treaties.     It  is  to 
be  the  Congress  of  the  Confederation,  and  of  course  to  last  as  long 
as  the  Confederation  endures.     Such  is  the  necessary  result,  and 
that  such  is  the  design  of  its  founders,  appears  from  the  provision 
authorizing  the  removal  of  the  seat  of  Government,  by  the  vote 
of  a  majority,  if  ever  the  casualties  of  war,  or  any  other  cause, 
may  render  it  advisable  to  do  so.   There  is  no  express  stipulation 
as  to  the  manner  of  acting  by  the  Congress.    Our  Government 
required  information  upon  this  point,   and  afterwards,  as  I  have 
already  stated,  consented  to  act  without  it.     But  that  its  decisions 
are  to  be  governed  by  a  majority,  results  from  the  propriety  of  that 
course,  from  the  equality  of  representation,  from  the  provision  that 
such  shall  be  the  case,  in  relation  to  the  place  of  meeting,  and  the 
absence  of  any  other  provision  in  regard  to  the  other  concerns  of 
the  Congress.     This  view  of  the  subject  is  confirmed  by  the  letter 
from  the  Government  Council  of  Peru,  to  the  Government  of  Bue 
nos  Ayres,  of  the  2d  of  May  last,  urging  a  union  in  the  arrange 
ments  of  the  Congress,  in  which,  after  stating  that  if  the  world 
had  to  elect  a  Capital,  "the  Isthmus  of  Panama  would  be  pointed 
"  out   for  that  august  destiny,  placed  as  it  is  in  the  centre  of  the 
**  globe,  looking  on  the  one  side  to  Asia,  and  on  the  other  to  Afri- 
"ca  and  Europe  :    that  the  Isthmus  had  been  offered  for  that  pur- 
"pose  by  the  Republic  of  Colombia  ;  that  it  was  at  an  equal  dis- 
"  tance  from  both  extremities,  and,  on  that  account,  might  serve  as 
"a  provisional  place  for  the^zrsf  Assembly  of  the  Confederates." 
Ft  is  added,  that,  "  in  the  first  conference  between  the  Plenipoten- 
"  tiaries,  the  residence  of  the  assembly,  and  its  powers*   may  be 
"  settled  in  a  solemn  manner,  by  the  majority,  after  which  every 
"  thing  will  be  arranged  to  our  satisfaction." 

We  have  been  invited  to  unite  in  a  Congress  thus  constituted. 
The  Executive  asks  our  consent  to  his  acceptance  of  that  invitation. 
What  are  the  limits  contained  in  the  invitation,  and  the  restriction 
prescribed  in  the  proposed  acceptance  ?  They  consist  in  this,  and 
in  this  only:  that  the  United  States  shall  not  be  called  upon  to  do 
any  act,  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  war  between  Spain 
and  the  other  States,  which  will  conflict  with  our  neutral  obliga 
tions.  If  there  be  any  other  restriction  or  limitation,  1  call  upon 


11 

gentlemen  to  point  it  out.    I  affirm  that  there  is  none.    I  do  not 
ask  gentlemen  for  the  suggestions  or  opinions  of  those  either  within 
or  without  doors.    I  appeal  to  the  documents  by  which  we  are  to 
judge  now,  and  by  which  we  shall  be  judged  hereafter.    If  no  other 
is  pointed  out,  I  shall  assume  that  none  exists.     We  are  then  in 
vited  to  become  a  member  of  the  proposed  Congress,  and  of  this 
confederacy  of  American  States.     If  the  views  of  the  Executive  are 
not  such  as  the  documents  import,  why,  in  the  communications 
made  to  us,  are  we  not  specially  advised  upon  this  point?     But  we 
are  not  without  evidence  of  the  most  explicit  character.     We  have 
called  upon  the  Executive  for  information.     Among  other  things 
sent  us,  are  extracts   from  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Clay 
and  Mr.  Poinsett,  our  Minister  at  Mexico.     When  the  declara 
tions  of  one  of  our  Ministers,  bearing;  distinctly  upon  a  question 
before  the  Senate,  made  directly  and  officially  to  a  foreign  Govern 
ment,  is  sent  to  us  by  the  Executive,  without  explanation  or  disa 
vowal,  I  know  not  how  we  are  to  avoid  the  conclusion,  that  the 
Minister  has  spoken  a  language  authorized  by  his  Government. 
More  especially  must  that  be  the  case  when  the  declaration  of  the 
Minister,  instead  of  being  disavowed  by  his  Government,  is  sub 
stantially  in  accordance  with  the  declarations  of  its  official  organ, 
the  Secretary  of  State.     If  this  assumption  be  correct,  much  light, 
as  to  the  views  of  our  Government,  may  be  derived  from  the  cor 
respondence   before  referred  to,  between   Mr.  Poinsett  and  Mr. 
Clay.     In  the  letter  of  the  former  to  the  latter,  of  the  28  h  Septem 
ber,  1825,  we  find  the  following  sentiments:     "  I  first  objected  to 
"  the  exception  in  favor  of  the  American  Nations,  formerly  Spanish 
"  possessions,  on  the  ground  that  no  distinctions  ought  ti»  be  made 
"  between  any  of  the  members  of  the  Great  Americas  Family. 
'  That  Great  Britain  having  consented  to  such  a  provision,  ought 
11  not  to  influence  the  American  States,  because  the  Republics  of 
"  America  were  united   by  one  and  the  same  interest,  and  that  it 
"  was  the  interest  of  the  European  Powers  to  cause  such  distinc- 
"  tions  to  be  made,  as  would  divide  it  into  small  confederacies, 
*'  and,  if  possible,  to  prevent  us  from  uniting,  so  as  to  present  one 
if  front  against  the  attempts  of  Europe,  upon  our  Republican  Insti- 
"  tutions."     And  afterwards  still  more  explicitly,  as  follows:  •'  I 
<f  then  recapitulated  the  course  of  policy  pursued  towards  the  Span- 
11  ish  colonies,  by  our   Government,  which  had  so  largely  contri- 
"  buted  to  secure  their  independence,  and  declared  what  further 
"  we  were  willing  to  do  to  defend  tkdr  rights  and  liberties,  but  that 
"  this  could  only  be  expected  from  us,  and  could  only  be  accom- 
"  plished  by  a  strict  union  of  all  the  American  Republics,  on  terms 
"  of  perfect  equality  and  reciprocity ;  and  repeated  that  it  was 
"  the  obvious  policy  of  Europe  to  divide  us  into  small  confedera- 
"  cies,  with  separate  and  distinct  interests;  and  as  manifestly  ours 


12 

"  to  form  a  single  great  confederacy,  which  might  oppose  one  united 
"front  to  the  attacks  of  our  enemies." 

So  far  from  disapproving  the  sentiments  thus  avowed  by  Mr. 
Poinsett,  in  his  letter  of  the  28th  September,  Mr.  Clay  in  his  de 
spatch  to  Mr.  Poinsett,  of  the  9th  November,  holds  the  following 
language :  •«  Again  the  United  Mexican  Government  has  invited 
"  that  of  the  United  States  to  be  represented  at  the  Congress  of 
"  Panama,  and  the  President  has  determined  to  accept  the  invita- 
"  tion.  Such  an  invitation  has  been  given  to  no  European  Govern- 
"  ment>  and  ought  not  to  have  been  given  to  this,  if  it  is  not  to  be 
ft  considered  as  one  of  the  American  Nations."  It  is,  therefore, 
fair  to  conclude,  that  the  language  of  Mr.  Poinsett  to  the  Mexican 
Government  was  authorized  by  his  own ;  and  if  this  be  conceded, 
the  views  of  the  Executive  must  be  such  as  I  have  contended. 
With  these  views,  ought  we  to  join  a  Congress  thus  constituted  ? 
I  contend  we  ought  not  if  we  could,  and  that  the  power  to  do  so  is 
not  conferred  by  the  Constitution.  I  will  not  detain  the  Senate 
by  the  discussion  of  either  of  those  points.  The  first  is  too  plain 
to  require  elucidation — and  in  noticing  the  second,  (the  constitu 
tional  objection,)  I  only  repeat  an  objection,  first  made  on  this 
floor  by  my  friend  from  Virginia,  (Mr.  RANDOLPH.)  The  distinct 
and  impressive  view  he  has  taken  of  it,  and  the  knowledge  that  the 
point  has  been  fully  considered,  and  will  be  thoroughly  discussed, 
by  at  least  two  other  gentlemen,  (Messrs.  BENTON  and  BERRIEN,) 
induces  me  to  desist  from  doing  so  myself. 

Such,  in  my  judgment,  is  a  correct  view  of  the  first  great  ques 
tion  arising  on  the  subject  of  the  Panama  Mission.  I  will  now  ask 
the  attention  of  the  Senate  to  the  next  branch  of  the  subject,  viz: 
THE  BUSINESS  TO  BE  TRANSACTED  at  the  Congress,  and  particularly 
that  portion  of  it  in  which  we  have  been  invited  to  participate. 
Unless  I  greatly  deceive  myself,  the  difficulties  will  be  found  to 
multiply  as  we  proceed  in  the  discussion  of  the  matters  proposed 
to  be  acted  unon,  so  far  as  the  United  States  are  concerned.  There 
are  those  which  in  the  view  of  the  Spanish  American  States*  as 
well  as  of  our  own  Government,  are  of  primary  importance;  and 
others  of  a  secondary  character,  which,  athough  they  would  not 
have  furnished  adequate  inducement  for  the  invitation  or  accept 
ance,  are  still  deemed  worthy  of  consideration  if  our  ministers 
attend.  Of  the  former,  stipulations  on  our  part  to  make  common 
cause  withth?  Spanish  JUmerifan  States*  in  the  event  of  any  Euro 
pean  Power  assisting  Spain  to  re  establish  her  dominionin  Spanish 
•flmerica,  and  resistance  to  European  Colonization  on  this  continent, 
stand  in  the  front  ground.  But  for  these,  the  United  States  would 
never  have  been  invited  to  send  a  representative  to  the  Congress 
of  Panama.  But  for  these,  the  presence  of  our  deputies  would 
cause  embarrassment,  instead  of  affording  facilities  to  the  confeder 
ate  States.  Never  in  the  course  of  the  little  experience  which  it 
has  been  my  good  or  ill  fortune  to  have  had  in  public  affairs,  have 


13 

I  been  more  thoroughly  disappointed,  as  to  the  probable  course  ot 
discussion  upon  any  point  than  I  have  been  upon  this.  That  our 
Ministers,  or  Commissions-is,  or  Deputies,  or  whatever  else  they 
may  be  called,  shall  be  fully  empowered  to  enter  into  an  a^re^ment 
(in  whatever  form  gentlemen  may  please)— first,  that  the  United 
States,  upon  the  happening  of  the  cants  feeder ia,  the  interference  of 
any  of  the  Powers  of  Europe,  in  th  -  struggle  between  Spain  and 
her  revolted  Colonies,  shall  make  common  cause  with  the  latter  in 
repelling  such  interference;  and,  secondly,  that  we  shall  resist, 
either  jointly  or  separately,  all  attempts  on  the  part  of  any  Euro 
pean  Power  to  establish  new  Colonies  in  this  hemisphere,  are  mat 
ters  so  precisely  enumerated,  and  so  clearly  concurred  in  by  all 
parties,  that  I  did  not  imagine  either  that  the  views  of  our  Govern 
ment,  or  those  of  the  Spanish  American  States,  in  regard  to  them, 
could  be  misunderstood  by  any  honorable  gentleman.  Judge  then 
of  my  surprize,  to  hear  it  denied  from  all  quarters  that  such  views 
are  entertained  by  the  Executive — to  hear  it  announced,  that  if 
there  were  grounds  to  believe  that  any  such  agreement  was  contem 
plated,  there  would  be  perfect  unanimity  in  the  Senate  in  check 
ing,  in  its  birth,  a  design  so  adverse  to  the  interests  of  this  country. 
A  state  of  things  so  unexpected,  necessarily  changes  the  course  of 
discussion  from  an  attempt  to  prove  the  impolicy  of  the  contem 
plated  measure,  to  the  establishment  of  the  position  that  such,  in 
reality,  are  the  views  of  the  Executive.  From  the  year  1818  to 
1823,  a  sort  of  rivalship  existed  in  this  country  between  the  Presi 
dent,  (Mr.  MONROE)  and  a  quasi  opposition  to  his  administration, 
on  the  subject  of  Spanish  American  aftYirs.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
boldest  steps  were  taken  to  impel  the  administration  to  the  recog 
nition  of  the  independence  of  Spanish  America,  accompanied  by 
unreserved  censures  on  the  imputed  reluctance  and  timidity  of  the 
Government.  This  spirit  was  combatted,  on  the  part  of  the  ad 
ministration,  by  ascribing  their  conduct  to  a  prudent  and  circum 
spect  policy,  designed  to  eftect  the  greatest  good  with  the  least 
possible  hazard.  Time  will  not  permit  the  enumeration  of  the 
various  acts  of  the  contending  parties  on  the  political  arena  in 
reference  to  this  matter:  suffice  it  to  say,  that,  in  1823,  Mr. 
MONROE  determined  to  crown  the  measures  of  the  Government 
upon  this  subject,  by  adopting  a  course  in  relation  to  it,  to  which, 
while  it  rendered  efficient  service  to  the  Spanish  American  cause, 
could  not  fail  to  secure  to  his  administration  the  reputation  of 
being  its  greatest  patron.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy  he,  in  his 
Message  of  December,  1823,  among  other  things,  said — "  We  owe 
"  it,  therefore,  to  candor,  and  to  the  amicable  relations  subs  sting 
"  between  the  United  States  and  those  Powers  [the  Powers  of  Eu- 
•'  rope]  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their 
"part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere,  as 
"dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  Colonies 


5,or  dependencies  of  any  European  Powers, we  have  not  interfered, 
"and  shall  not  interfere.     But  with  the  Governments  who  have 
"declared  their  Independence,  and    maintained  it,  and   whose 
*'  independence  we  have  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  prin- 
"ciples  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition,  for 
"the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling,  in  any  manner, 
their  destiny,  by  any  European  Power,  in  any  other  light  than  as 
the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United 
States,  in  the  war  between  those  New   Governments  and   Spain. 
We  declared    our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their  recognition  ; 
and  to  this  we  have  adhered,  and  shall  continue  to  adhere,  pro- 
vided  no  change  shall  occur  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  com- 
petent  authorities  of  the  Government,  shall  make  a  correspond- 
ing  change  on  the  part  of  the  United    States,  indispensable  to 
their  security."     And  further,  in  the  discussion  with  Russia  re 
lative  to   the  Northwestern  coast  of  this  continent,  the   occasion 
was  embraced,  "  for  asserting,  as  a  principle,  in  which  the  rights 
•«and  interests  of  the  United  States  were  involved,  that  the  Am- 
"erican   continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  position  which 
"  they  had  assumed  and  maintained,  were  thenceforward  not  to 
"  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
«  Power." 

The  character  and  effect  which  has  been  given,  or  attempted  to 
be  given,  to  these  declarations,  is  full  of  instruction  as  to  the 
probable  consequences  of  similar  acts  at  this  day.  To  say  here 
that  they  did  not  pledge  the  United  States  to  any  course,  would  be 
superfluous.  There  are  few  who  require  to  be  informed  that  no 
declaration  of  the  Executive  could  have  that  effect.  But  he  had 
no  such  intention.  He  asserted  (if you  please)  correct  principles, 
but  left  us  at  liberty  to  act,  or  not,  in  enforcing  them,  as  our  in 
terest  or  our  policy  might  at  the  moment  require  :  a  question  to  be 
decided  like  all  similar  questions,  by  determining  whether,  under  all 
circumstances,  it  will  best  promote  the  honor  and  interest  of  the 
Country  to  act  or  stand  still.  But  how  strangely  have  these  de 
clarations  been  distorted  not  only  by  others,  but  our  public  function 
aries  themselves.  In  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs 
of  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  to  the  Envoy  of  the  Republic  of 
Buenos  Ayres,  of  the  6th  of  March  last,  announcing  the  assent  of 
the  Republic  of  Peru,  to  the  proposition  of  the  General  Assembly 
of  the  American  States  at  Panama,  and  requesting  the  concurn  nee 
of  the  Government  of  Buenos  Ayres,  it  is  stated  that  among  the 
objects  of  the  Congress  will  be  "to  take  into  consideration  the 
"  means  to  give  effect  to  the  declaration  of  the  President  of  the 
"United  States  of  America,  in  his  Message  to  the  Congress  last 
"  year,  concerning  the  means  to  prostrate  any  ulterior  design  of 
"  colonization  upon  this  continent,  by  the  Powers  of  Europe,  and 
tjresis»t  all  interference  in  our  domestic  concerns." 


15 

In  the  letter  of  invitation  from  the  Mexican  Minister,  Mr.  Ob- 
regon,  of  the  25th  of  November  last,  he  says  the  "Government  of 
"  the  subscriber,  never  supposed  nor  desired  that  the  United  States 
"would  take  part  in  the  Congress  about  to  be  held,  in  other  mat 
ters  than  those  which,  from  their  nature  and  importance,  the 
"late  administration  pointed  out  as  being  of  general  interest  to  the 
"  continent,  for  whichreason,  one  of  the  subjects  which  will  occupy 
"the  attention  of  the  Congress,  will  be  the  resistance  or  opposition 
"  to  the  in*erf*ren  e  of  any  neutral  nation  in  the  question  and  war  of 
"  independence  between  the  new  Powers  of  the  continent  and  Spain. 
u  The  Government  of  the  undersigned  apprehends  that,  as  the  Pow- 
'*  ers  of  America  are  of  accord  as  to  resistance,  it  behoves  them  to 
"  discuss  the  means  of  giving  to  that  resistance  all  possible  force, 
"  that  the  evil  may  be  met  if  it  cannot  be  avoided  :  and  the  only 
"  means  of  accomplishing  this  object  is  by  a  previous  concert  as  to 
"  the  mode  in  which  each  of  them  shall  lend  its  co-operation,"  &c. 

"  The  opposition  to  colonization  is  in  the  like  predicament  with 
"the  foregoing."* 

Having  thus  specified  the  objects  of  deliberation,  he  invites  our 
Government  to  send  "Representatives"  to  the  Congress  of  Panama, 
with  authorities  as  aforesaid,  and  with  cypress  instructions  upon 
the  two  principal  questions. 

Mr.  Salazar.  th*  Colombian  minister,  in  his  letter  of  invitation 
of  the  2d  November  last,  thus  expresses  himself  upon  the  topics 
referred  to :  *'  The  manner  in  which  all  colonization  of  European 
*'  Powers,  on  the  American  continent,  shall  be  resisted,  and  their 
"  interference  in  the  present  contest  between  Spain  and  her  former  colo- 
"  nies  prevented,  are  other  points  of  great  interest.  Were  it  proper, 
•"  an  eventual  alliance,  in  case  these  events  should  occur,  which 
"  is  within  the  range  of  possibilities,  and  the  treat/i  of  which  no 
41  use  should  be  made  until  the  casus  foederis  should  happen,  to  re- 
"  main  secret;  or,  if  this  should  seem  premature,  a  convention  so 
"  anticipated  would  be  different  means  to  secure  the  same  end,  of 
"  preventing  foreign  influence.  This  is  a  matter  of  immediate 
"  utility  to  the  American  States  that  are  at  war  with  Spain,  and  is 
"  in  accordance  with  the  repeated  declarations  of  the  Cabinet  oj 
•»  Washington." 

Mr.  Canas,  the  Minister  of  the  Republic  of  Central  America, 
says,  that,  "  as  Europe  has  formed  a  Continental  system,  and  held 

*  "  Most  of  the  new  American  Republics  have  declared  their  entire  assent 
*'  to  them,  and  they  now  propose  among  the  subjects  of  consultation  at 
"  Panama,  to  take  into  consideration  the  means  of  making  effectual  the  as- 
41  ser'.ion  of  that  principle,  (resistance  to  European  colonization,)  as  -well  as 
"  the  means  of  restating  interference  from  abroad  -with  the  domestic  concerns  of 
ff  the  American  Government."  President's  message  to  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives. 


16 

"  a  Congress  whenever  questions  affecting  its  interests  were  to  be 
*6  discussed,  America  should  have  a  system  for  itself,  and  assem- 
"  ble,  by  its  Representatives  in  Cortes,  when  circumstances  of  ne- 
"  cessity  and  great  importance  should  demand  it." 

The  views  entertained  by  those  Governments,as  to  the  condition 
of  the  United  States,  in  relation  to  its  obligation  to  resist  any  at 
tempts  on  the  part  of  Europe  upon  the  two  subjects  referred  to,  ap 
pears  still  more  clearly  from  the  fact,  stated  by  our  Secretary  of 
State,  (Mr.  Clay,)  that  when,  in  the  course  of  the  last  summer,  an 
invasion  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  was  apprehended,  from  the  appear 
ance  of  a  French  fleet  in  our  waters,  we  were  promptly  called  on, 
by  the  Government  of  Mexico,  to  fulfil  the  alleged  pledge  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  in  his  message  of  December,  1823.  Such  are  the  views 
and  expectations  of  the  Spanish  American  States,  in  inviting  us  to 
the  Congress  of  Panama. 

Permit  me  now  to  show  how  far  these  extravagant  pretensions 
have  b?en  encouraged,  countenanced,  and  recognized,  by  our  own 
Government.  I  confess,  sir,  that  I  approach  this  part  of  the  sub 
ject  with  regret  and  disappointment.  If  I  know  my  heart,  it  har 
bors  no  inclination  to  view  either  this  or  any  measure  of  the  Go 
vernment,  with  any  other  feelings  than  those  of  libenlity  and  in 
dulgence.  But,  if  there  be  here  no  cause  for  censure,  I  am  under 
the  influence  of  the  grossest  delusion. 

I  have  before  had  occasion  to  allude  to  the  correspondence  of 
Mr.  Poinsett,  our  Minister  at  Mexico.  The  discretion  of  this  gen 
tleman  is  well  known,  and  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  con 
ceive,  that  he  would  commit  the  honor  and  interest  of  his  country, 
upon  a  point  of  great  delicacy  and  importance,  unless  authorized 
by  the  letter  of  his  instructions.  The  communications  from  the 
Executive  contain  no  intimation  of  his  having  transcended  his  in 
structions  ;  and  the  striking  coincidence  between  his  declarations, 
and  those  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  leaves  little  ground  to  think 
that  he  has  done  so.  In  his  letter  to  Mr.  Clay,  of  the  28th  of  Sep 
tember  last,  speaking  of  his  discussions  with  the  plenipotentiaries 
of  the  Mexican  Government,  upon  the  subject  of  the  Commercial 
Treaty,  then  under  negotiation,  he  says:  "  To  these  observations, 
"  I  replied  that,  against  the  power  of  Spain,  they  had  given  suffi- 
"  cient  proof  that  they  required  no  assistance,  and  the  United 
"  States  had  PLEDGED  THEMSELVES  not  to  permit  any  other  Power 
"  to  interfere,  either  wish  their  independence,  or  form  of  Govern- 
"  merit;  and  that,  as,  in  the  event  of  such  an  attempt  being  made 
"  by  the  Powers  of  Europe,  we  would  be  compelled  to  take  the  most 
"  active  arid  efficient  part,  and  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  contest,  it  was 
"  not  just  that  we  should  be  placed  on  a  less  favorable  footing  than 
"  the  other  Republics  of  America,  whose  existence  we  were  ready 
"  to  support  at  such  hazards." 


17 

The  language  of  the  Secretary  coincides  with  that  of  Mr.  Poin- 
sett.  In  his  letter  to  the  latter,  of  the  9th  November,  he  thus  ex 
presses  himself:  "  No  longer  than  about  three  months  ago,  when  an 
"invasion  by  France  of  the  island  of  Cuba  was  believed  at  Mexico, 
"the  United  Mexican  Government  promptly  called  upon  the  Go- 
*fvernment  of  the  United  States,  through  you,  to  fulfil  the  memo~ 
"  rable  pledge  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message 
"  to  Congress  of  December,  1823.  What  they  would  have  done, 
"had  the  contingency  happened,  may  be  inferred  from  a  des- 
"  patch  to  the  American  Minister  at  Paris,  a  copy  of  which  is  here- 
"  with  sent — which  you  are  at  liberty  to  read  to  the  Pienipotentia- 
**  ries  of  the  United  Mexican  States." 

Mr.  President— Consider,  for  a  moment,  the  entire  coincidence 
between  the  language  expressed  abroad  by  Mr.Poinsett,  our  minis 
ter,  and  at  home  by  Mr.  Clay,  the  responsible  organ  of  the  Govern 
ment,  and  if  you  do  not  concur  with  me  in  thinking  it  amounts  to  a  re 
cognition  of  a  pledge  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  of  the  character 
claimed  by  the  Spanish  American  States, and  an  avowal  of  our  readi 
ness  to  redeem  it,  I  will  hereafter  distrust  the  clearest  deductions  of 
my  understanding.  Had  the  opinion  of  the  Executive  been  different, 
the  languageof  our  Government,  instead  of  declaring  what  we  would 
have  done,  "had  the  contingency  happened,"  would  have  been, 
what  it  ought  to  have  been,  an  explicit  disavowal  of  all  obligation 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  take  any  other  part  in  anv  state 
of  things,  than  that  which  the  interests  of  the  country  might  be 
supposed  to  require.  But  if  a  doubt  could  exist  as  to  the  views  of 
the  Executive,  it  would  be  dispelled  by  a  reference  to  the  invita 
tions  and  letters  of  acceptances,  especially  when  connected  with 
the  subjects  referred  to.  In  the  letters  of  invitation,  the  Mexican 
and  Colombian  Ministers,  specify  the  subjects  which,  in  their 
view,  are  of  "  general  interest  to  the  Continent,  viz— resist 
ance  to  European  interference — aad  colonization— -and  request  that 
our  Ministers  should  have  express  instructions  upon  these  two 
"  principal  questions."  Our  Government,  without  questioning  the 
specification,  thus  made  at  their  instance,  in  the  letters  of  accept 
ance,  say,  that  our  Commissioners  to  the  Congress  of  Panama  will 
be  fully  empowered  and  instructed  upon  all  questions  likely  to 
arise  in  the  Congress,  on  subjects  which  the  Nations  of  America 
have  a  common  interest.  What  those  subjects  are,  had  been  stated 
by  the  parties  inviting,  with  express  reference  to  our  explanations, 
and  unequivocally  assented  to  by  us.*  The  President,  in  his 

*  The  views  here  taken»  are,  it  is  contended,  confirmed  by  the  last  Message 
of  the  President  to  the  House  of  Kepresentatives.  The  expressions  of  Mr. 
Poinsett  were  referred  to  in  support  of  the  folio  wing  declaration  of  the  Mexican 
Minister,  contained  in  his  note  of  invitation :  "  The  Government  of  the  under- 
^signed  apprehends  that,as  thePowers  of  America  are  of  accord  as  to  resistance, 
3 


18 

message  communicating  the  nominations,  leaves  the  subject  of  Eu 
ropean  interference  in  the  struggle  between  Spain  and  her  former 
Colonies,  to  the  correspondence  between  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
the  inviting  Governments,  to  which  I  have  referred  ;  but  on  the 
subject  of  colonization  he  contemplates  an  agreement  between  all 
the  parties  represented  at  the  meeting,  "  that  each  will  guard,  by 
"its  own  means,  against  the  establishment  of  any  future  European 
"  Colonies  within  its  borders."  If  these  two  prominent  points 
were  not  intended,  by  our  Government,  to  be  the  subjects  on  which 
stipulations  were  to  be  entered  into  at  the  Congress,  what  was 
meant  by  the  President  in  his  declaration  to  the  ministers  of  Mexico 
and  Colombia,  that,  in  his  opinion,  "such  a  Congress  might  benignly 
ft  useful  in  settling  several  important  questions  of  public  law,  and 
"  in  arranging  other  matters  of  deep  interest  to  the  American  Conti- 
"  nent  ?"  And  if  it  be  indeed  true  that  the  proponed  mission  is 
designed  to  be  no  more  than  a  matter  of  compliment  to  our  sister 
Republics,  without  subjecting  the  rights  or  duties  of  the  United 
States  to  the  decision  of  that  Congress,  then  why  the  solicitude, 
on  the  part  of  our  Government,  to  adjust  previously  the  powers  to 
be  given  to  the  deputies,  and  the  mode  of  its  organization  and  ac 
tion  ?  But  I  forbear  to  multiply  proofs  upon  this  point.  Had  it 

*'  it  behoves  them  to  discuss  the  means  of  giving1  to  that  resistance  all  possible 
"force,  that  the  evil  maybe  met  if  it  cannot  be  avoided?  and  the  only  means  of 
*'accomplishingthisobject,isby  a  previous  cowcerJ  as  to  the  mode  in  which  each 
"  shall  lend its  co-operation  "  And  of  that  of  Mr  Salazar,  the  Colombian  Minister, 
that  these  views  are  '*  n  strict  accordance  with  the  repeated  declarations  and 
*'  protests  of  the  Cabinet  of  --Vashington."  Mr.  Poinsett,  in  his  communication 
with  the  Mexican  Government,  urges  favorable  commercial  stipulations,  on  the 
ground  of  our  liability  to  aid  the  Spanish  American  States,  in  resisting  Euro 
pean  interference  in  their  internal  concerns.  Mr.  Clay,  in  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Poinsett,  refers  that  obligation  to  '*  the  memorable  pledge  of  the  President 
"of  the  U>  ited  States,  in  his  Message  to  Congress,  in  December,  1823"  In 
the  report  communicated  to  the  tL  use  of  Representatives,  with  the  Message 
now  referred  to,  the  Secretary  says:  '-If,  indeed,  any  attempt  by  force  had 
*'  been  made  by  allied  Europe,  to  subvert  the  liberties  of  the  Southern  Nations 
"on  this  Continent,  and  to  er^ct  upon  the  ruins  of  the  free  institutions,  monar- 
"chical  systems,  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  have  stood  pledged,  in 
"the  opinion  of  the  Executive,  not  to  any  foreign  State,  but  to  themselves 
"and  their  posterity,  by  their  dearest  interests  and  highest  duties,  to  resist  to 
"  the  utmost  such  an  attempt ;  and  it  is  to  a  pledge  of  that  character  that  Mr. 
"Poinsett  alone  refers."  These  are  but  different  modes  of  accounting  for 
and  describing  the  same  thing.  An  obligation,  on  our  part,  in  a  certain  event  to 
assist  Spanish  America,  equally  warranting  the  inference  that  the  "outhern  Re 
publics  expect  that  stipulations  u  'Oil  that  subject  will  be  made  at  the  Con 
gress  of  Panama,  and  that  our  Government  are  willing  to  do  so;  no  one 
supposed  that  Mr.  Poinsett  had  been  specially  instructed  to  make  or  renew 
any  pledge  upon  this  subject,  or  that  he  had  done  S'\  He  was  instructed  to 
*' impress  the  principles  of  the  Message  of  Mr.  Monroe,  in  1823,  upon  the 
"Government  of  the  United  Mexican  States,"  anJ  he  has  done  it  in  a  man- 
ner  satisfactory  to  our  Government.  What  that  manner  was;  the  above  ex,- 
tracts  from  his  letter  shew- 


Hot  been  for  the  strong  manifestation  of  unwillingness,  on  the  part 
of  the  Senate,  to  enter  into  any  such  agreement,  I  am  strongly  in 
clined  to  think  no  question  would  have  been  made  respecting  it. 
With  these  Governments,  above  all  others,  it  is  both  our  duty  and 
policy  to  observe  the  most  scrupulous  sincerity  and  good  faith. 
With  them,  at  least,  we  ought  not  to  encourage  expectations  not 
intended  to  be  realized — a  coarse  alike  reprehensible  in  principle, 
and  ruinous  in  its  effects.     It  is,  then,  the  design  of  the  Execu 
tive  to  enter  into  an  agreement  at  the  Congress,  (it  is  not  material 
for  the  present  in  what  form,)  that  if  the  Powers  of  Europe  make 
common  cause  with  Spain,  or  otherwise  attempt  the  subjugation  of 
Spanish  America,  we  shall  unite  with  the  latter,  and  contribute  our 
proportion  of  the  means  necessary  to  make  resistance  effectual  : 
and  further,  that  we  thall   bind  ourselves,  at  that  Congress,  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  we  shall  resist  any  attempts,  by  the  iMiropean 
Powers,  to  colonize  any  portion  of  this  Continent.     This  design 
has  been  fully,  frankly,  and  explicitly  stated  to  the  Spanish  Ameri 
can  States,  and  to  us.     Is  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  willing 
to  sanction  a  measure  of  that  description?    I  care  not  for  the  pre 
sent  whether  it  be  by  treaty  or  by  act,  decree,  or  ordinance  of  the 
Congress.     Will  you  in  any  shape  or  form,  preliminary  or  final, 
give  to  it  your  sanction?     Upon  this  subject,  at  least,  we  have  had 
*'  thoughts  that  breathe."     In  the  confidence  that  I  do  not  misun 
derstand  them,  I  will  venture  to  affirm  that  there  is  not  a  member 
on  this  floor  who  will   avow  his  willingness  to  enter  into  such  a 
stipulation.    If  mistaken,  I  desire  to  be  corrected.     No — I  am  not. 
Whatever  may  be  his  views,  no  one,  within  these  walls,  is  yet  pre 
pared  to  give  his  sanction  to  such  a  measure — a  measure  by  which 
the  peace  of  the  country  is  to  be  exposed  to  a  contingency  beyond 
the  control  of  our  Government — by  which  the  great  question  of 
peace  or  war  will  be  taken  from  the  Representatives  of  the  People- 
by  which,  instead  of  retaining  that  freedom  of  action,  which  we 
now  possess,  we  shall  bind  ourselves,  in  a  certain  event,  to  pursue 
a  certain  course,  whatever  those,  to  whom  the  government  of  the 
country  may  then  have  been  committed,  shall  think  the  honor  or 
interest  of  the  country  may   require — by  which,  in  the  language 
of  the  Father  of  his  Country,  we  "shall  quit  our  own  to  stand  on 
foreign  ground."    No — thank  Heaven — a  policy  so  opposite  to  all 
the  feelings  of  the  American  People  ;  so  adverse,  as  I  firmly  be 
lieve  it  to  be,  to  its  true  interests,  has  no  friend,  at  least  no  advo 
cate  on  this  floor.    If,  by  any  act  of  ours,  we  contribute  to  its 
adoption,  it  will  be,  (ancl  I  derive  infinite  satisfaction  from  that 
conviction,)  through  a  mistaken  belief  that  the  measure  of  which 
I  speak  is  not  contemplated  by  the  Executive.     It  has,  I  know, 
been  said,  that  if  such  views  are  elsewhere  entertained,  they  can 
be  effected  by  Treaty  only,  and  that  the  Senate  may  refuse  its  sanc 
tion.    That  this   would  be  the  fate  af  such  a  treaty,  is  certain. 


20 

But,  if  correct  in  my  position,  that  the  Executive  has  distinctly 
apprized  you  of  his  intention  to  negotiate  such  a  treaty,  with  what 
propriety  can  you  refuse  to  ratify  ?  What  excuse  can  you  give 
your  friends,  the  Spanish  American  States,  for  the  entire  prostra 
tion  of  all  th?  expectations  vou  have  rarsed  ? 

What  justification  will  you  be  able  to  render  to  your  constituents 
for  the  exacerbation  which  would  result  from  the  rejection  of  stip 
ulations,  deriving  sanction  from  your  acquiescence,  if  not  your  ap 
proval  ?  None,  that  I  can  perceive ;  none,  most  certainly,  that 
they  will  approve. 

But  let  it  be  supposed  that  I  mistake  the  intention  of  the 
President  and  his  cabinet — that  our  Ministers  are  to  have  no- 
such  instructions.  Reject,  if  you  please,  the  irresistible  evi 
dence  of  a  fixed  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Executive, 
to  form,  with  the  South  American  States,  a  dangerous  political 
connection.*  What,  let  me  ask,  will  be  the  consequence  of  de 
clining  a  proposed  co-operation  ?  Let  it  be  remembered  that 
they  consider  the  recognition  of  their  independence  by  Spain  as 
essential  to  their  security  ;  that  their  only  ground  of  apprehension 
is  the  assistance  which  may  be  yielded  to  Spain  by  the  Powers  of 
Europe,  and  that,  to  prevent  this  aid,  they  place  reliance  on  the 
anticipated  compact  with  us.  Can  there  then  be  a  doubt  whether 
a  failure  to  enter  into  the  proposed  stipulations  would  tend  to 
impair  our  friendl)  relations?  Will  they  not  refer  you  to  your 
own  exposition  of  the  message  of  Mr.  Monroe,  of  1823;  to  the 
assurance  given  by  Mr.  Poinsett  to  the  Mexican  Government ; 
to  the  despatch  of  Mr.  Clay  in  reply  to  their  application  ;  to 
the  explicit  avowal  of  their  motives  in  inviting  us  to  the  Con 
gress  ;  and  to  our  unreserved  acceptance  of  that  invitation  ?  And 
if  holding  to  our  view  this  mass  of  evidence,  which,  unfortunately, 
it  would  not  be  in  our  power  to  palliate,  to  cancel,  or  deny,  they 
should  charge  us  with  insincerity  and  duplicity — where  would  we 
find  an  advocate  so  unblushing  as  to  attempt  our  justification,  or 

*  In  the  late  message  of  the  President  to  the  House  of  Representatives  sent 
after  the  decision  of  the  Senate,  he  represents  his  views  upon  this  subject,, 
in  the  following  explicit  terms  : 

''Compare  our  situation  and  the  circumstances  of  that  time,  with  those  of 
"  the  present  day,  and  what,  from  the  very  words  of  Washington,  then,  would 
"  be  his  counsels  to  his  countrymen  now  ?  Europe  has  still  her  set  of  primary 
*'  interests  with  which  we  have  little  or  a  remote  relation.  Our  distant  and 
tj  detached  situation,  with  reference  to  Europe,  remains  the  same.  But  we 
"  were  then  the  only  independent  nation  of  this  hemisphere,  and  we  were 
"  surrounded  by  European  colonies,  with  the  greater  part  of  which  we  have 
"  no  more  intercourse  than  with  the  inhabitants  of  another  planet.  Those 
"  colonies  have  now  been  transformed  into  eight  independent  nations,  ex- 
"  tending  to  our  very  border  Seven  of  them,  Republics  like  ourselves*. 
"  with  whom  we  have  an  immensely  growing  commercial,  and  must  have.. 
v  and  have  already,  important  political  connections." 


21 

to  urge  that  our  conduct  had  heen  marked  with  the  frankness  ana 
singleness  of  purpose  which  are  the  surest  defence  of  all  Republi 
can  Governments,  and  have  hitherto  been  the  boast  and  glory  of 
our  own  ?  The  fair  fame  of  our  Republic  would  be  tarnished— 
shame  would  precede  our  approach — and  disgrace  follow  in  our 
path.  Is  it  possible,  if  such  be  the  natural,  the  inevitable  result  of 
the  favorable  construction  assumed  by  ihe  advocates  of  the  mission, 
that  the  mission  itself  can  receive  the  sanction  of  the  Senate,  or  the 
support  of  the  People? 

The  subject  I  have  thus  far  considered,  is  avowedly  the  principal 
inducement  to  the  mission.  Others,  of  subordinate  character,  have 
been  thrown  out  for  consideration  ;  but  I  affirm  that  there  is  not 
one  wholly  free  from  serious  objection — not  one  from  which  there 
is  reasonable  ground  to  expect  either  credit  or  advantage.  I  will 
briefly  consider  those  suggested  in  the  message.  And  first,  that 
which  may  justly  be  said  to  be  least  objectionable  :  "  The  comen- 
"  famous  adoption  of  principles  of  maritime  neutrality,"  such  as, 
"  that  free  ships  skull  make  free  goods,  and  the  restriction  of  reason 
"  upon  the  txtent  of  blockades.'*  To  effect  this  object,  it  is  not  ne 
cessary  to  unite  with  the  Congress  of  Panama.  It  may  be  reached 
in  another  way.  That  it  can  be  better  attained  at  the  Congress  is 
mere  conjecture.  The  probability  is  different.  No  evidence  is 
afforded  that  the  ministers  of  the  confederate  States  will  be  empow- 
ed  to  enter  into  treaties  concerning  their  foreign  relations.  But, 
should  it  be  otherwise,  what  great  object  remains  to  be  accomplish 
ed  ?  With  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  standing  at  the  head  of  the 
confederacy,  we  have  already  entered  into  a  treaty,  containing  all 
the  proposed  stipulations.  With  that  of  Central  America,  we  hav« 
been  alike  successful.  With  Mexico,  we  have  reason  to  believe 
that  a  similar  treaty  has  been  formed,  and  w?  know,  if  our  negotia 
tion  with  that  Government  is  not  yet  finally  concluded,  that  this 
point  presents  no  serious  obstacle.  Can  it,  then,  be  urged  by  any 
honorable  member,  that  he  apprehends  serious  difficulty  in  negotia 
ting  treaties  with  the  smaller  States,  similar  to  those  we  have  al 
ready  concluded  with  the  larger?  1  think  not.  Why,  then,  go  to 
Panama  ? 

But,  if  any  such  object  could  be  accomplished  at  the  Congresses 
this  the  time  most  suitable  to  effect  it?  In  my  judgment  it  is  not. 
The  reasons  are  obvious.  Those  States  are  at  war.  Their  views, like 
those  of  other  States,  will  be  controlled  by  their  condition.  The 
relation  of  neutral  and  belligerent  is  not  the  state  best  adapted  to 
the  amicable  adjustment  of  neutral  rights.  The  interests  of  the 
parties  are  adverse — the  war  in  which  they  are  engaged,  involves 
their  existence,  and  they  may  not  now  be  disposed  to  believe  the 
adoption  of  a  principle  is  expedient,  because  they  know  it  to  be 
just.  But  when  are  the  principles,  proposed  to  be  established,  to 
have  their  beneficial  operation  ?  During  the  present  war  they  caw 


22 

not.  Take,  for  instance,  the  stipulation  that  free  ships  shall  make 
free  goods.  A  modern  condition  attached  to  that  stipulation  is, 
that  it  shall  be  binding  only  in  cases  where  the  property  sought  to 
be  protected  by  the  flag  of  the  neutral,  belongs  to  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  a  country,  whose  Government  is  bound  by  a  similar  en 
gagement.  We  have  a  stipulation  in  our  treaty  with  Spain,  that 
free  ships  shall  make  free  goods.  Suppose  the  case  of  goods  belong 
ing  to  the  citizens  of  either  of  the  Spanish  American  States,  found 
on  board  of  one  of  our  vsesels.  Will  Spain  respect  it  ?  No.  She 
denies  the  capacity  of  her  revolted  colonies  to  enter  into  treaty 
stipulations,  and  she  seizes  the  property  as  belonging  to  her  rebel 
lious  subjects.  Unless,  therefore,  you  can  force  Spain  to  recognize 
their  independence,  you  cannot  oblige  her  to  respect,  as  far  as  re 
gards  them,  this  article  in  our  treaty  with  her.  If  Spain  does  not, 
as  she  assuredly  will  not,  will  the  Southern  Republics  ?  Can  you 
expect  it?  Ought  you  to  ask  it?  And  Spain  and  those  Republics 
are  the  only  belligerents.  If  the  operation  of  the  desired  stipula 
tions  is  to  be  deferred  to  a  future  period,  to  that  period  let  their 
settlement  be  also  deferred.  At  present  there  is  little  reason  to 
hope  that,  upon  this  point,  any  advantageous  stipulation  can  be 
made  at  the  Congress.  The  enumeration  of  these  objects  may 
serve  to  make,  on  paper,  an  imposing  parade  ;  but  on  paper  only. 

I  forbear  to  notice  the  objectionable  manner  in  which  these 
principles  of  international  law  are  proposed  to  be  settled  ;  the 
occasion  does  not  require  it. 

"The  indirect  influence  which  the  United  States  may  exercise  upon 
61  any  projects  or  purposes  originating  in  the  war,  in  which  the 
•«  Southern  Republics  are  still  engaged,  which  might  seriously 
"  affect  the  interests  of  this  Uni&n,"  is  another  of  the  objects  re 
ferred  to  by  the  Executive  as  among  the  "contingent  and  eventual 
motives"  to  the  mission.  I  subscribe  to  the  complaints  of  the 
worthy  gentleman  from  Tennessee  (Mr.  White)  of  the  want  of  clear 
ness  in  the  diplomatic  language  held  throughout  upon  this  subject. 
Why  not  specify  what  those  •'  projects  or  purposes"  are  supposed 
to  be,  so  that  we  may  act  understanding!)'  ?  This  part  of  the 
message  is  however  supposed  to  refer  to  the  probable  designs 
of  the  confederate  States  upon  the  Islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico.  The  gentleman  from  Rhode  Island  (who,  unlike  most 
of  those  who  agree  with  him  in  opinion,  has  assigned  the  reasons 
which  will  determine  his  vote,  supposes  that  nothing  can  be  decided 
by  the  Congress  on  this  subject.  In  this  he  is  doubtless  mistaken. 
We  have  before  us  abundant  evidence,  that,  if  the  independence 
of  Spanish  America  is  not  recognized  bv  old  Spain,  the  fate  of 
those  Islands  is  to  be  settled  by  the  Congress  of  Panama.  Mr. 
Salazar  informs  our  Government  "  that  the  fortune  of  these  Islands 
must  be  decided  in  the  Congress  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama:" 
Assuming  (as  we  may)  that  this  will  be  the  case,  can  we  effect  any 


23 

thing  by  sending  a  representation  to  that  Congress  ?  I  have  earn 
estly  reflected  on  this  branch  of  the  subject,  as  one  in  which  the 
United  States  are  deeply  concerned,  and  the  result  is  a  conviction 
that  under  existing  circumstances,  no  benefit  whatever  can 
result  from  the  measure  proposed.  Before  I  assign  my  spe 
cific  reasons  for  this  opinion,  I  shall  be  excused  for  a  brief 
reference  to  the  novel  and  embarrassing  position  of  our  depu 
ties  in  "ffering  advice  on  the  fate  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico. 
They  must  present  themselves  as  the  representatives  of  a  Power 
which  seeks  a  peace  through  the  mediation  of  anothpr  Power, 
which  maintains,  theoretically,  the  right  of  Spain  to  the  islands  in 
question  ;  as  the  representatives  of  a  Power  which  has  advocated 
a  peace  by  which  they  are  to  be  forever  condemned  to  Spain.  They 
go  to  confederate  with  a  Congress  of  free  States  for  the  purpose  of 
resisting  the  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  ;  and  of  supportwg^  so 
far  as  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  are  concerned,  the  views,  if  not  the  doc 
trines  of  the  Holy  Alliance;  and  that  too  under  the  auspices  of  the 
very  head  of  that  unhallowed  combination.  We  affect  to  glory  in. 
the  success  of  the  principles  upon  which  the.  revolution  of  Spanish 
America  is  founded — but  still  consent  to  become  the  advocates  of 
a  peace  which  will  condemn  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  to  the  yoke  of 
Spain  ;  and,  for  the  very  justifiable  and  consistent  reason,  that 
our  interests  require  it ! !  But,  leaving  these  glaring  inconsistencies 
to  their  merited  fate,  what  are  we  to  do  ?  What  can  we  do  ?  It 
is  contended  that  the  interests  of  our  country  require  that  the  con 
dition  of  Cuba  should  remain  unchanged.  That  upon  this  point 
we  should  hazard  every  thing.  Admit  the  fact  ;  will'our  Ministers 
be  allowed  to  take  that  ground  ?  Can  the  Executive  instruct  them 
to  protest  against  any  movements  on  the  part  of  the  confederate 
States  against  those  Islands  ?  To  admonish  them  of  its  impropriety, 
and  denounce  resistance  ?  No,  sir.  Upon  a  subject  of  such  vital 
importance,  the  only  one  in  which  our  presence  at  the  Congress 
could  be  useful,  the  Executive  has  already  taken  a  step  which  he 
can  never  retrace.  Deceived  by  the  artful  letter  of  Count  Nessel- 
rode  ;  misled  by  the  unsuspecting  confidence  of  Mr.  Middle- 
ton  ;  and  supposing  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  would  under 
take,  in  earnest,  the  desired  mediation,  and  that,  under  his  high 
auspices,  its  success  would  be  inevitable  ;  he  has  solemnly  declared 
that  we  fiught  not  and  will  not  resist  the  attempts  of  the  confede 
rates  upon  these  Islands,  should  Spain  refuse  compliance.  In 
the  letter  from  Mr.  Clay,  to  Mr.  Middleton  of  the  10th  of 
May  last,  instructing  him  to  invite  the  mediation  of  Russia, 
which  was  read  to  the  Colombian  Minister,  and  communi 
cated  to  the  principal  European  Governments,  it  is  declared,  4<  and 
"  thus  the  Peninsula,  instead  of  derivhg  the  revenue  and  the  aid 
"  so  necessary  to  the  revival  of  its  prosperity  from  Cuba  and  Por- 
"  to  Rico,  must  be  further  drained  to  succor  those  islands  ;  for  it 
"  cannot  be  doubted,  that  the  new  States  will  direct  their  com- 


24 

**  bined  and  unemployed  forces  to  the  reduction  of  those  valuable 
•'  islands.  They  will  naturally  strike  their  enemy  wherever  they 
"  can  reach  him,  and  they  will  be  stimulated  to  the  attack  by  the 
"  double  motive  arising  from  the  richness  of  the  prize,  and  from 
"  the  (act  that  those  islands  constitute  the  rendezvous  of  Spain, 
"where  are  concentrated,  and  from  which  issue,  all  the  means  of  an- 
"  noyingthem  which  remain  to  her."  Having  understood  that  an 
expedition  was  fitting  out  at  Carthagena  against  Cuba  or  Porto 
Rico,  by  Colombia,  or  Mexico,  or  both,  our  Secretary  of  State,  on 
the  20th  of  December  last,  addressed  notes  to  the  Ministers  of 
those  Governments,  in  which,  after  assuring  them  that  by  late  ad 
vices  from  St.  Petersburg,  he  was  enabled  to  say  that  the  appeal  to 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  had  not  been  without  eff.-ct,  and  that  there 
was  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  then  exerting  his  friendly  en 
deavors  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  he  solicited  their  Governments, 
in  the  name  of  the  President,  "  to  forbear  to  attack  those  Islands 
"until  a  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  to  ascertain  the  result  of  the 
"  pacific  efforts  the  gre;it  Powers  are  now  making  on  Spain."  These 
communications  were  transmitted  by  those  Ministers  to  their  res 
pective  Governments;  and  finally,  in  the  letter  from  the  Secretary 
to  Mr.  Middleron,  of  the  26th  of  December,  he  thus  explicitly 
communicates  the  views  and  opinions  of  this  Government  on  the 
subject:  "  We  cannot  allow  the  transfer  of  the  Islands  to  any  Eu- 
"ropeasi  Power.  But  if  Spain  should  refuse  to  conclude  a  peace, 
"and  obstinately  resolve  on  continuing  the  war,  although  we  do 
**not  desire  that  either  Colombia  or  Mexico  should  acquire  the 
'* Island  of  Cuba,  the  Prrsidmt  cannot  see  any  justifiable,  ground 
'*  on  which  we  can  forcibly  interfere.  Upon  the  hypothesis  of  an 
"  unnecessary  protraction  of  the  war,  imputable  to  Spain,  it  is  evi- 
"  dent  that  Cuba  will  be  her  only  point  d'appui  in  this  hemisphere, 
fl  How  can  we  interpose,  on  that  supposition,  against  the  party 
"  CLEARLY  HAVING  KiGHT  ON  HIS  SIDE,  to  retrain  or  defeat  a  lawful 
61  operation  of  war?  If  the  war  against  the  Islands  should  be  con- 
"ducted  oy  those  Republics  in  a  desolating  manner;  if,  contrary 
"  to  all  expectation,  they  should  put  arms  into  the  hands  of  one 
"  race  of  the  inhabitants  to  destroy  the  lives  of  anoth  r ;  if,  in  short, 
'*  they  should  countenance  and  encourage  excesses  and  examples, 
"the  contagion  of  which,  from  our  neighborhood,  would  be  danger- 
<f  ous  to  our  quiet  and  safety ;  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
"might  feel  itself  called  upon  to  interpose  its  power.  But  it  is 
"  not  apprehended  that  any  of  those  contingencies  will  arise,  and 
''consequently,  it  is  most  probable  that  the  United  States,  should 
"the  war  continue,  will  remain  hereafter,  as  thty  have  been  herc- 
"  tofore,  neutral  observers  of  the  progress  of  events."  Mr.  Mid- 
dleton  was  directed  to  communicate  the  contents  of  this  letter  to 
the  Russian  Government,  and  they  were, doubtless,  also  communi 
cated  to  the  Colombian  and  Mexican  Ministers,  with  the  views 
which  induced  the  communication  to  them  of  the  former  letter  to 


25 

Mr.  Middleton  on  the  same  subject.*  Now,  Sir,  should  the  con 
federate  States  think  the  invasion  of  those  Islands  necessarv  to 
the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war,  can  our  Ministers  at  the  Con 
gress,  with  these  deliberate  opinions  and  unequivocal  declarations 
of  our  Government,  raise  a  voice  against  the  measure  ?  If  they 
did  so,  would  not  the  deputies  from  the  other  States  charge  our 
Government  with  insincerity  ?  would  not  the  evidence  to  support 
the  impurntion  be  complete?  and  is  it  not  in  their  possession  ?  Is 
it  reasonable  to  expect,  that,  in  a  war,  waged  not  only  for  their  se 
curity,  but  existence,  they  could  be  induced  to  be  more  attentive  to 
our  interests  than  their  own  ?  No,  Sir,  in  my  judgment,  the  period 
for  efficient  operation  on  that  point,  through  the  agency  of  minis 
ters,  has  passed  away.  ,  If  the  United  States  are  willing,  if  it  be 
their  interest  to  resist,  at  all  hazards,  and  by  whomsoever  attempt 
ed,  the  invasion  of  those  Islands,  the  manifestation  of  that  resolu 
tion,  to  be  efficient,  must  proceed  from  another  branch  of  the  Gov 
ernment — the  legislature,  They  are,  fortunately,  unfettered  by 
diplomatic  entanglements.  If  our  deputies  there  cannot  effect  this 
object,  what  are  they  to  do?  Surely  not  to  countenance  measures 
which  may  be  adopted  by  the  assembled  States  against  those  Islands. 
This  would  be  not  only  to  counteract  our  views,  but  make  our 
selves,  at  once,  a  party  to  the  war.  Suppose,  that,  doing  neither, 
they  remain  passive  spectators,  and  the  invasion  is  directed  by  the 
Congress.  Being  a  war  measure,  all  proceedings  upon  it  must  be 
secret.  Can  we  hope  to  allay  the  awakened  jealousies  of  Spain, 
that  we  have  connived  at,  if  not  sanctioned,  the  invasion  of  her 
territory  ?  Will  we  not,  at  all  events,  be  driven  to  the  necessity 
of  extensive  and  humiliating  explanations  to  the  Government  im 
mediately  concerned,  and  to  those  to  whom  we  have  made  profes 
sions  on  the  subject  ?  Why  thus  embarrass  ourselves  ?  Why  ren 
der  our  relations  upon  this  subject  more  complicated  than  they  are  ? 
Is  it  to  favor  Old  Spain  ?  No — we  have  uniformly  disapproved 
and  reprobated  her  conduct.  We  owe  her  nothing.  Whatever  we 
may  say  to  the  contrary,  we  know,  and,  what  is  more,  the  world 
knows,  that  it  is  solely  on  the  ground  of  the  utter  helplessness  of 
her  condition,  that  we  wish  the  continuance  of  her  dominion  over 
these  Islands.  To  favor  the  Southern  Republics  ?  The.y  do  not  ad 
mit  that  this  is  a  subject  in  which  we  have  any  concern.  It  is  not 
one  in  which  they  have  asked  or  expect  us  to  take  a  part.  They 
know  that  we  cannot  interfere  without  violating  our  neutrality. 
They  do  not  want  our  aid,  and  would  only  be  embarrassed  by  our 
interference.  Is  it  for  the  benefit  of  these  Islands  themselves  ?  No-~ 
we  have  deliberately  abandoned  them  to  their  fate.  We  have  formal- 

*  This  important  letter  has  not  been  laid  before  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives. 

4 


26 

lyacquiesced  in  the  hopelessness  of  their  condition,  and  labored  to 
make  their  connection  with  Spain  indissoluble.  In  this  particular, 
at  least,  our  interference  and  our  counsels  have  been  adverse  to 
those  free  and  liberal  principles,  in  whose  success,  in  the  South 
American  States,  we  so  justly  and  so  cordially  triumph.  Such  is 
now  eur  embarrassing  condition.  How  has  it  been  produced  ?  Is 
it  not  evidently  the  result  of  a  course  of  measures  which  we  seetn 
determined  to  "prosecute  still  farther?  Is  it  not  the  fruit  of  over 
action,  of  an  unwise  anxiety  to  figure  in  great  concerns  ?  Of  an  am 
bition  to  take  upon  ourselves  the  business  of  other  nations,  to  the 
prejudice,  if  not  neglect  of  our  own  ?  How  different  would  have 
been  our  condition,  if  instead  of  all  this  diplomacy,  we  had  simply 
and  plainly  informed  the  Governments  of  Spanish  America  what  we 
have  said  to  the  Powers  of  Europe  ;  that  we  woold  not  suffer  the  oc 
cupation  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  by  any  other  Power  except  Spain, 
cost  what  it  might.  Depend  upon  it,  sir,  we  should  then  have  had 
no  difficulties  concerning  Cuba  ;  nor  would  we  have  been  reduced 
to  the  necessity  of  sending  deputies  to  the  Congress  of  Panama,  to 
extricate  ourselves  from  the  meshes  of  our  own  weaving. 

But  we  are  informed  by  the  President,  that  we  "  may  rxercise 
"  good  offices,  which  may  ultimately  contribute  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
"  fpeedy  termination."  Where  lies  the  difficulty,  permit  me  to  ask, 
in  the  way  of  pacification  ?  With  Old  Spain  ?  What  is  the  great 
point  in  controversy  ?  Independence.  Shall  we  become  the  ad 
vocates  of  its  surrender  ?  Shall  we  urge  upon  the  new  Republics 
to  purchase  it  by  degrading  concessions,  or  by  any  which  they  have 
not  already  evinced  their  willingness  to  make  ?  Mexico  and  Co 
lumbia  have  already  declared  their  readiness,  upon  the  acknowledg 
ment  of  their  Inde'pendence,  to  desist  from  any  attempts  upon  Cu 
ba  and  Porto  Rico.  Their  sincerity  cannot  be  doubted.  Have 
they  any  thing  else  to  offer  as  the  price  of  their  recognition  ?  Is  it 
commercial  preferences,  the  equivalent  of  Hayti  to  France  ? 

The  President  intimates  that,  at  times,  they  have  evinced  this 
disposition.  But  he  would  doubtless  be  the  last  to  encourage  a 
measure  so  fatal  to  our  interests.  Nothing  therefore  can  be  done, 
not  already  attempted  without  success.  If  we  must  appear  in 
the  office  of  mediators — an  object  of  so  much  apparent  solicitude 
with  our  Government— let  our  appeals  be  directed  to  Spain,  where 
alone  they  can  be  availing.  But,  let  us  remember,  that  oar  admo 
nitions,  our  remonstrances,  our  solicitations,  will  derive  no  addi 
tional  weight,  from  the  circumstance  that  they  emanate  from  the 
bosom  of  a  Congress,  composed,  with  the  single  exception  of  the 
United  States,  of  the  representatives  of  her  confederate  foes.  Will 
we  not,  on  the  contrary,  by  the  proposed  step,  render  all  our  future 
efforts  abortive  ?  Shall  we  not,  by  it,  have  taken  a  stand,  incon 
sistent  with  our  assumed  mediatorial  office  ? 

The  next  subject  proposed  by  the  President,  is  the  influence  our 


27 

Representatives  at  the  proposed  Congress ,  may  have  in  promoting  the 
advancement  of  religious  liberty.  Upon  this  subject  he  says, 
"  There  is  yet  another  subject  upon  which,  without  entering  into 
"  any  treaty,  the  moral  influence  of  the  United  States  may,  per- 
"  haps,  be  exerted,  with  beneficial  consequences,  at  such  a  meet- 
"  ing — the  advancement  of  religious  liberty.  Some  of  the  South- 
*'  ern  Nations  are  even  yet  so  far  under  the  dominion  of  preju- 
"  dice,  that  they  have  incorporated  with  their  political  constitutions 
"  an  exclusive  "church,  without  toleration  of  any  other  than  the 
"  dominant  sect.  The  abandonment  of  this  last  badge  of  reli- 
fi  gious  bigotry  may  be  pressed  more  effectually  by  the  united 
*'  exertions  of  those  who  concur  in  the  principles  of  freedom 
"  of  conscience,  upon  those  who  are  yet  to  be  convinced  of  their 
'*  justice  and  wisdom,  than  by  the  solitary  efforts  of  a  minister 
"  to  any  one  of  the  separate  Governments." 

The  strong  ground  upon  which  this  matter  has  been  placed  by 
the  Committee,  would  render  any  thing  like  an  elaborate  discussion 
of  it  by  me  inexcusable.  "  That  the  Apostolic  Roman  Catholic 
"  Religion,  shall  be  the  religion  of  the  State,"  is  among  the  fore 
most  articles  in  all  the  Constitutions  of  the  Spanish  American 
States,  as  it  was  in  the  late  Constitution  of  Old  Spain.  It  is  not 
to  be  doubted,  that  most  of  the  leaders  in  Old  Spain,  during  the 
Constitutional  Government,  and  the  Patriots  who  achieved  the  in 
dependence  of  Spanish  America,  were  as  just  and  liberal  in  their 
religious,  as  they  have  shewn  themselves  to  have  been  in  their  poli 
tical  principles  !  It  is  not  within  the  laws  of  character  like  theirs, 
to  be  the  advocates  of  intolerance  of  any  description.  It  is,  there- 
fore,  but  fair  to  presume,  that  exertions  in  favor  of  religious  toler 
ation  were  omitted,  from  a  conviction  that  they  could  not  have  been 
made  without  disturbing  the  public  feeling  to  an  extent  injurious, 
if  not  destructive,  to  the  great  object  of  the  Revolution. 

This  inference  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  those  who 
have  had  opportunities  to  become  acquainted  with  the  subject. 
From  these  we  learn  that  the  establishment  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Religion  was  a  matter  of  indispensable  necessity.  They  inform 
us,  that  the  Patriot  cause  was  greatly  indebted  for  its  success  to  the 
exertions  of  the  lower  order  ©f  Ecclesiastics,  who,  in  opposition  to 
the  Bishops,  threw  the  great  weight  of  their  influence  into  the  Re 
volutionary  scale  :  that  all  that  order,  and  those  they  influence, 
constituting  the  physical  force  of  the  country,  would,  unhesitatingly, 
desert  the  party  who  abandoned  what  they  honestly  consider  to  be 
the  only  true  faith.  Add  to  these  considerations  the  fact,  that 
there  are  no  sects  in  the  country,  and  we  will,  perhaps,  have  more 
reason  to  commend  the  discretion  of  the  Patriots  in  leaving  that 
matter  to  the  silent  progress  of  liberality  in  public  sentiment,  than 
to  censure  their  seeming  insensibility  to  what  the  President  justly 
regards  as  among  the  greatest  of  all  human  privileges — religious 


28 

freedom.  It  appears  to  me.  (with  deference  to  the  high  source  from 
whence  this  suggestion  proceeds,)  that,  from  all  we  know  of  the  great 
body  of  the  people,  nothing  could  have  a  greater  tendency  to  defeat 
the  objects  of  the  Congress,  and  to  endanger,  if  not  destroy,  the 
present  order  of  things  in  Spanish  America,  than  the  promulgation 
of  the  idea  that  any  change  or  modification  in  the  religious  estab 
lishment  of  the  country,  was,  in  anyway,  to  be  effected  or  acceler 
ated  at  that  assembly.  If  we  send  deputies  there  with  any  such 
views,  however  restricted  in  their  powers,  their  arrival  will  be  re 
garded  as  a  calamity.  The  Committee  have  spoken  with  great 
truth  of  the  public  opinion  in  this  country  on  the  subject  of  inter 
ference,  direct  or  indirect,  with  the  internal  concerns  of  other  States, 
and  especially  of  that  most  deHcate  of  all  subjects — the  religion  of 
its  inhabitants.  On  a  reference  to  the  treaties  between  the  confed 
erate  States,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  views  expressed  are  in  strict 
conformity  with  theirs.  It  will  be  seen  that,  on  this  subject,  they 
were  not  willing  to  trust  to  construction,  but  inserted  express  stip 
ulations,  against  any  interference  with  the  internal  concerns  of  the 
respective  States. 

[Mr.  VAN  BUREN  said,  that  he  had  thus  far  discussed  the  subject 
.without  reference  to  the  question,  how  far  the  adoption  of  the  mea 
sures  proposed  would  conflict  with  our  neutral  obligation,  and  thus 
conduce  to  a  war  with  Spain.  He  then  proceeded  to  the  discus 
sion  of  that  branch  of  the  subject;  declaring,  at  the  same  time,  that 
it  had  been  so  fully  and  so  ably  discussed  by  the  gentleman  from 
South  Carolina,  (Mr.  HAYNE,)from  New  Hampshire,  (Mr.  WOOD- 
BURY,)  and  from  Tennessee,  (Mr.  WHITE,)  that  he  despaired  of  be 
ing  able  to  do  more  than  repeat  objections  which  had  already  been 
urged  with  so  much  eloquence  and  ability.  The  remarks  he  made 
are  not  published.  He  then  continued] — I  will  now,  Mr.  President, 
call  the  attention  of  the  Senate  to  another  view  of  this  subject,  to 
a  question  of  the  gravest  character,  and  most  deeply  affecting  the 
dearest  interests  of  the  country — a  question  growing  out  of  con 
siderations  which  have  heretofore  occupied  the  best  minds,  and  in 
terested  the  purest  hearts  our  country  has  produced  :  "  WOULD  IT 

"  BE  WISE  IN  US  TO  CHANGE  OUR  ESTABLISHED  POLICY  UPON  THE 
"  SUBJECT  OF  POLITICAL  CONNECTIONS  WITH  FOREIGN  STATES  j" 

The  President  has  said,  that,  "  to  form  alliances,"  is  not  among  the 
motives  of  our  attendance  at  the  Congress.  But  what  description 
of  alliance  does  he  mean?  They  are  of  various  kinds,  and  of  dif 
ferent  extent.  We  are,  at  that  Congress,  to  stipulate  in  some  form, 
(and  I  care  not  in  what,)  that  we  will  resist  any  attempt  at  colo 
nization  by  the  Powers  of  Europe  in  this  hemisphere,  (or  within 
our  own  borders  if  you  please,)  and  that,  in  the  event  of  any  interfer 
ence  on  their  part,  in  the  struggle  between  Spain  and  the  Spanish 
American  States,  we  will  make  common  cause  with  the  latter  in 


29 

resisting  it.  To  this  end  we  have  been  invited,  and  upon  these 
points  we  have  promised  that  our  ministers  shall  have  full  powers. 
We  must  do  this,  or  the  whole  affair  becomes  empty  pageantry  ; 
which,  though  it  may  be  the  offspring  of  personal  ambition,  will  as 
suredly  terminate  in  national  disgrace.  Call  it  an  "  alliance," 
or  whatever  name  you  please,  it  is  a  political  connection,  at  war 
with  the  established  policy  of  our  Government.  And  is  this  a  light 
matter?  Sir,  when  it  is  proposed  to  subvert  a  fundamental  prin 
ciple  in  our  foreign  policy,  in  the  support  of  which  we  stand  ALONE 
among  all  the  nations  of  the  earth — which,  commencing  with  our 
Government,  is  endeared  to  the  people,  and  upon  whose  deep 
foundations  has  been  erected  the  magnificent  superstructure  of 
unequalled  national  prosperity;  it  surely  becomes  those  entrusted 
with  the  management  of  affairs,  to  pause,  and  weigh,  with  scrupu 
lous  exactness,  the  importance  of  the  step. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  I  shall  first  consider  the  general 
principle  ;  then  the  grounds  of  the  distinction  attempted  to  be 
made  between  its  application  to  the  Spanish  American  States,  and 
to  those  of  Europe.  At  this  moment,  the  United  States,  (thanks 
to  the  wisdom  of  their  early  counsels  !)  are  unfettered.  No  Go 
vernment  has  a  right  to  demand  our  aid  or  interference  in  any  of 
the  changes  in  the  condition  of  the  world — come  what  may,  we  are 
now  unembarrassed  in  our  choice.  Until  lately,  I  had  flattered 
myself  that  the  acknowledged  obligation  on  the  part  of  our  Go 
vernment  to  maintain  that  condition,  was  as  firmly  fixed  as  its  Re 
publican  character.  I  had  the  best  reason  to  think  so,  because  I 
knew  it  to  be  a  principle  in.  our  public  policy,  which  had  for  its 
support  all  that  is  instructive  in  experience,  all  that  is  venerable 
in  authority.  That  authority  is  no  less  than  the  parting  admoni 
tions  of  the  Father  of  his  Country.  The  earnest,  eloquent,  and  im 
pressive  appeals  upon  this  subject,  contained  in  his  Farewell  Ad 
dress,  are  yet,  and  will,  I  trust,  long  remain  fresh  in  our  recollec 
tions  ;  nor  were  the  sentiments  he  thus  avowed  mere  speculative 
opinions,  founded  upon  an  abstract  consideration  of  the  subject. 
No  !  they  were  sentiments  matured  by  reflection,  and  confirmed 
by  actual  experience,  of  the  practical  results  which  had  arisen 
from  a  connection  of  the  character  he  so  ardently  and  so  justly  de 
precated.  A  reference  to  the  history  of  that  period  will  illustrate 
the  fact,  and  is  replete  with  instruction.  During  the  war  of  our 
Revolution,  we  entered  into  an  alliance  with  France,  "  the  essen 
tial  and  direct  end  of  which  was  to  maintain  effectually  the  liberty, 
sovereignty,  and  independence  of  the  United  States,  absolute  and 
unlimited,  as  well  in  matters  of  Government  as  of  commerce."  By 
the  treaty  of  alliance,  we,  in  consideration  of  the  guarantee  by  France 
of  the  freedom  and  independence  of  the  United  States,  undertook, 
on  our  part,  to  guaranty  to  France  the  possessions  she  then  had 


30 

in  America.  The  revolution  in  France  involved  that  country  in 
war  with  the  principal  Powers  of  Europe.  Her  American  posses 
sions  were  brought  in  danger;  and,  among  other  things,  claimed 
under  the  treaty  of  alliance,  she  called  upon  us  for  the  fulfilment 
of  our  guarantee.  At  no  period  of  our  history  has  our  Govern 
ment  been  placed  in  a  more  humiliating  and  embarrassing  Situation. 
The  signal  benefits  we  had  received  from  France  were  known  to 
the  world,  and  fully  appreciated  by  our  citizens.  Upon  the  terms 
of  the  compact  there  could  be  no  dispute.  The  consideration  up- 
on  which  we  had  entered  into  it,  was  of  the  most  sacred  character. 
But  the  danger  of  compliance  was  imminent,  and  prevailed  over 
every  other  consideration.  Reposing  itself  upon  the  great  princi 
ple  tf  self  preservation — a  principle  extending  itself  as  well  to  na 
tions  as  individuals — our  Government  refused  to  comply  with  its 
engagement ;  and  General  Washington  issued  his  celebrated  pro 
clamation  of  neutrality.  The  grounds  relied  upon  to  justify  the 
step  were,  that  our  alliance  was  a  defensive  one  only;  that  the  war, 
on  the  part  of  France,  was  an  offensive  war,  in  which  we  were  not 
obliged,  by  the  law  of  nations,  to  take  part;  that  the  contest  was, 
moreover,  so  unequal,  and  our  means  so  inadequate,  that,  upon  the 
principle  of  self-preservation,  we  were  justified  in  refusing  to  take 
part  with  our  ally.  It  was  not  expected  that  France  would  ac 
quiesce  in  the  validity  of  the  grounds  thus  taken.  She  did  not. 
The  loud  solemn  protests  of  her  Ministers  are  remembered;  as,  al 
so,  the  measures  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining,  indirect 
ly,  some  of  the  advantages  claimed  from  the  alliance  :  such  as  fit 
ting  out  vessels  of  war  in  our  ports,  and  enlisting  our  citizens  in 
her  service.  England  remonstrated,  made  strong  imputations  of 
partiality  against  our  Government — imputations  founded  on  suspi 
cions  growing  out  of  the  known  connection  between  us  and  France — 
and  resorted  to  similar  means  to  annoy  her  enemies  and  commit 
our  neutrality.  General  Washington  found  it  impossible  to  satis 
fy  either  party  of  the  strict  impartiality  that  governed  our  conduct. 
The  result  was  war,  in  fact,  with  France,  and  many  of  the  evils  of 
war  with  England.  She  enforced  against  our  commerce  new  and 
unjustifiable  principles  of  public  law  on  the  subject  of  blockades 
and  articles  contraband  of  war.  The  sagacious  mind  of  Washing 
ton,  and  the  great  men  who  enjoyed  his  confidence,  traced  the  mul 
tiplied  embarrassments  of  the  country  at  that  trying  period,  to  the 
treaty  of  alliance  wilh  France.  Had  it  not  been  for  that,  the  task 
of  preserving  our  neutrality  would  have  been  comparatively  easy. 
There  would  then  have  been  wanting  those  great  sources  of  dis 
cord,  unsatisfied  claims  of  right  on  the  part  of  one  belligerent,  and 
food  for  jealousy  on  the  other.  It  was  under  a  deep  conviction  of 
this  truth,  that  that  inestimable  man  was  induced  to  address  his 
countrymen  in  language  like  this.  1  will  make  no  apology  for 
reading  it.  I  hope  to  God  that  the  time  will  never  arrive  when  ati 


31 

apology  will  be  necessary  for  reading  afty  thing  to  an  American 
Senate,  emanating  from  him,  and  bearing  upon  a  qu  -stioB  before  it. 

Extracts  from  the  Farewell  Address  of  General  Washington. 

'*  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  foreign  nations, 
"  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations,  to  have  with  them  as 
"  little  political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already 
"  formed  engagements,  let  them  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good 
"  faith. — Here  let  us  stop. 

"  Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  none, 
"  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence,  she  must  be  engaged  in  fre- 
41  quent  controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign 
"  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to 
"  implicate  ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes 
"  of  her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  of  her  friendships 
"  or  enmities. 

"  Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and  enables  us  to 
"  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we  remain  one  people,  under  an 
"  efficient  Government,  the  period  is  not  far  off,  when  we  may 
*'  defy  material  injury  from  external  annoyance;  when  we  may 
"  take  such  an  attitude  as  will  cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at  any 
"  time  resolve  upon,  to  be  scrupulously  respecied  ;  when  belliger- 
"  ent  nations,  umier  the  impossibility  of  making  acquisitions  upon 
"  us,  will  not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  us  provocation;  when  we 
"  may  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided  by  justice, 
"  shall  counsel. 

**  Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation  ?     Why 
*'  quit   our  own  to   stand  upon  foreign  ground  ?     Why,  by  inter- 
"  weaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle' 
"  our  peace  and  prosperity  in   the  toils  of  European  ambition,  ri- 
"  valship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice  ? 

*4  'Tis  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances  with 
"  any  portion  of  the  foreign  world  ;  so  far,  I  mean,  as  we  are  now 
"  at  liberty  to  do  it :  for  let  me  not  be  understood  as  capable  of 
"  patronizing  infidelity  to  existing  engagements.  I  hold  the 

maxim  no  less  applicable  to  public  than  to  private  affairs,  that 

honesty  is  always   the  best  policy.     I   repeat  it,  therefore,  let 

those  engagements  be  observed  in  their  genuine  sense.     But,  in 

my  opinion,  it  is  unnecessary,  and  would  be  unwise,  to  extend 

them." 

«'  In  offering  to  you,  my  countrymen,  these  counsels  of  an-old 
"  and  affectionate  friend,  I  dare  not  hope  they  will  make  the 
"  strong  and  lasting  impression  I  could  wish;  that  they  will  con- 
*  trol  the  usual  current  of  the  passions,  or  prevent  our  nation  from 
"  running  the  course  which  has  hitherto  marked  the  destiny  of 
"  nation*.  But,  if  I  may  ev<  n  flatter  myself,  that  they  may  be 
"  productive  of  some  partial  benefit,  some  occasional  good  ;  that 


32 

"  they  may  now  and  then  recur  to  moderate  the  fury  of  party 
"  spirit;  to^warn  against  the  mischiefs  of  foreign  intrigue;  to  guard 
"  against  the  impostures  of  pretended  patriotism;  this  hope  will  be 
"  a  full  recompense  for  the  solicitude  for  your  welfare,  by  which 
"  they  have  been  dictated." 

His  language  was  prophetic.  "  His  admonition  did  not  make  the 
strong  and  lasting  impression  he  wished."  At  the  extra  session  of 
Congress,  in  May,  1797,  his  successor,  in  his  Message  to  that  body, 
thus  expressed  himself: 

Extract  from  the  Message  of  President  Mams  to   Congress,  in 

1798. 

"Although  it  is  very  true,  that  we  ought  not  to  involve  ourselves 
'*  in  the  political  system  of  Europe,  but  to  keep  ourselves  distinct 
"  and  separate  from  it,  if  we  can  ;  yet  to  effect  this  separation,  early, 
**  punctual,  and  continual  information  of  the  current  chain  of  events, 
"  and  of  the  political  projects  in  contemplation,  is  no  less  necessary 
"  than  if  we  were  directly  concerned  in  them.  It  is  necessary,  in, 
"  order  to  the  discovery  of  the  efforts  made  to  draw  us  into  the 
"vortex,  in  season  to  make  preparations  against  them.  However 
"  we  may  consider  ourselves,  Ihe  maritime  and  commercial  Powers 
"  of  the  world  will  consider  the  United  States  of  America  as  form- 
"  ing  a  weight  in  that  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  which  never  can 
"be  forgotten  or  neglected.  It  would  not  only  be  again  t  our  in- 
"  terest,  but  it  would  be  doing  wrong  to  one-half  of  Europe  at  least, 
*'  if  we  should  voluntarily  throw  ourselves  into  either  scale.  It  is  a 
" natural  policy  for  a  nation  that  studies  to  be  neutral,  to  consult 
"  with  other  nations  engaged  in  the  same  studies  and  pursuits.  At 
"the  same  time  that  measures  ought  to  be  pursued  with  this  view, 
"  our  treaties  with  Prussia  and  Sweden,  one  of  which  is  expired, 
"  and  the  other  near  expiring,  might  be  renewed." 

This  communication  was  followed  by  the  nomination  of  a  min 
ister  (the  present  President  of  the  United  States,)  to  Berjiu,  to 
carry  into  effect,  the  avowed  object  of  the  mission.  This  early  de 
parture  from  the  principles  and  disregard  of  the  precepts  of  Wash 
ington,  was  met  by  the  united  and  most  vigorous  opposition  of  the 
Republicans  of  that  day.  An  attempt  was  first  made  in  the  Senate 
to  defeat  the  mission,  on  the  ground  of  its  inexpediency.  That 
failing,  the  appropriation  was  resisted  in  the  House  of  Represent 
atives,  in  a  debate  that  lasted  for  several  veeks.  It  was  the  drect 
cause  of  the  first  great  collision,  between  the  Republicans  of  that 
day,  and  the  then  President.  A  singular  and  extraordinary  sim 
ilarity  will  be  found  between  the  question  then  agitated,  and  the 
one  now  under  discussion.  It  was  then  contended  that  the 
United  States  ought  to  consult  with  other  nations  engaged  in  the 
same  studies  and  pursuits,  and  that  measures  ought  to  be.  pursued 
with  that  view.  Those  measures  were  understood  to  be  the  for 
mation  of  political  connections,  (beyond  the  ordinary  commercial 


33 

\ 

treaties,)  in  order  to  secure  co-operation  in  support  of  their  com 
mon  interest;  and  further,  that  it  belonged  to  the  President  to  decide 
on  the  question  of  the  propriety  of  a  mission  for  that  purpose,  and 
that  the  Senate  were  only  to  pass  on  the  fitness  of  the  persons  nomi 
nated.     What  is  now  contended  for,  and  what  the  policy  we  resi&t  ? 
That,  having  a  common  interest  with  the  Spanish  American  States, 
we  ought  to   meet  with  them    in    Congress  ;   in   the  language  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  President,  for 
the  purpose  of  "  settling  several  important  questions  of  public  law, 
"and  arranging  other  matters  of  deep  interest  to  the  American. 
"  Continent."    What  those  matters  are,  and  how  they  are  to  be  ar 
ranged,  has,  I  hope,  been  fully  developed  ;  and  further,  that  "this 
"measure  is  deemed  to  be  within  the  Constitutional  competency  of  the 
"  Executive  ;"  that  we  are  only  consulted  to  obtain  our  opinion  on. 
its  "expediency,"  and  because  it  is  necessary  to  come  to  us  for 
"an  appropriation,  without  which,  the  measure  cannot  be  carried 
into  effect."     Yes,  sir,  the  first  blow  that  was  struck  in  that  great 
contest,  which  subsequently  convulsed   the  country,  and  the  first 
voice  that  was  raised  to  arrest  the  current  of  events  then  setting  in, 
were  on  points,  to  all  substantial  purposes,  identical  with  the  pre 
sent.     Is  it  not  a  startling,  if  not  an  ominous  circumstance,  that,  so 
soon,  under  the  present  administration,  we  should  have  presented  to 
us,  in  such  bold  relief,  doctrines  and  principles,  which,  in  the  first 
year  of  that  to  which  I  have  referred,  laid  the  foundation  of  the 
most  bitter  and  unrelenting  feuds?   Does  the  analogy  stop  here  ? 
The  men  who  then  opposed  the  mission  to  Berlin  were  denounced 
as  oppositionists ;  as  &,  faction  who  sought  the  gratification  of  their 
personal  views,   at  the   expense  of  the  public  good ;    they  were 
lampooned,  and  vilified  by  all  the  presses  supporting  and  suppor 
ted  by  the  government,  and  a  host  of  malicious  parasites  generalled 
by  its  patronage.    Their  weight  of  character,  the  purity  of  their 
lives,  the  consistency  of  their  principles,  and  their  force  of  reason 
ing,  were  alike  unavailing.    It  was  sufficient  that  they  dared  to 
think  for  themselves  ;  to  prefer  what  they  regarded  as  the  interests 
of  their  constituents  to  the  wishes  of  the  Executive  ;  to  refuse  a 
ready  acquiescence  in  what  was  given  them  to  do;  and  every  puny 
whipster  in  the  land    felt   himself  at   liberty,  without  in  the  least 
understanding    the    question    involved,    to     misrepresent    their 
acts,  and  impugn  their  motives.     Respect  for  this  body,  and  a  just 
contempt  for  the   venal  efforts  of  venal  men,  restrains  me  from 
pushing  the  parallel  farther.   Covering  themselves  with  the  mantle 
of  Washington,  the  Republicans  of  '98  labored  manfully  to  strangle, 
at  its  birth,  this  political  hydra,  this  first  attempt,  since  the  estab 
lishment  of  the  government,  to  subject  our  political  affairs  to  the 
terms  and   conditions  of  a  political  connexion,  with  any  foreign 
nation.    I  ask  the  indulgence  of  the  Senate,  whilst  I  read  a  short 
5 


34 

extract  from  a  most  able  speech,  made  on  that  occasion  by  a  man 
whom  Mr.  Jefferson  described  as  being,  in  that  stormy  period,  "the 
main  mast  of  the  ship."  It  shews  the  striking  analogy  between 
the  questions. 

Extract  from  the  Speech  of  Albert  Gallatin  on  foreign  intercourse* 

"  The  President  of  the  United  States  conceives  that  it  is  a  na- 
"  tural  policy  for  us  to  comult  with  other  nations  engaged  in  the 
"  same  studies  and  pursuits,  and  that  measures  ought  to  ^pursued 
"with  this  view.  The  late  President  thinks  it  unwise,  by  inter- 
"  weaving  our  destiny  with  Europe,  to  entangle  our  peace,  unwise 
"to  implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties,  unwise  and  unnecessary 
"  to  extend  our  engagements.  His  opinion  is  emphatically  express- 
*'  ed  by  these  words,  '  Here  let  us  stop.' 

"But if  we  adopt  the  policy  to  consult  with  other  nations— -if 
16  measures  are  to  be  pursued  with  that  view — if  we  are  to  form 
"  new  foreign  political  connections ;  how  can  we  hope  to  escape 
"  being  unavoidably  drawn  into  the  vortex?  It  was,  after  having  thus 
"  communicatied  his  intention — it  was  in  pursuance  of  that  plan, 
"that  the  President  thought  fit  to  send  a  minister  to  Berlin.  With 
*'  Prussia,  we  have  no  commerce.  Had  commerce  been  the  object 
"of  that  embassy*  Sweden,  Denmark,  the  Hanse-towns,  or  Italy, 
"would  have  been  preferred.  The  mission  is  avowedly  and  ev 
idently  of  a  political  nature,  and,  if  we  are  to  consult  and  to 
*'  form  connections  with  nations,  who  may,  in  our  opinion,  be  en- 
"  gaged  in  similar  pursuits  with  ourselves — if  Prussia  is  considered 
"as  such — with  what  nation  in  Europe,  may  we  not  and  shall  we 
"not,  according  to  circumstances,  consult,  concert  measures,  and 
"  form  political  arrangements  ?  It  is  from  this  view  of  the  subject, 
"that  I  have  been  induced,  however  reluctantly,  fully  to  state  all 
"the  reasons  which  impress  upon  my  mind  a  conviction  of  the  im- 
"portance  of  the  present  amendment,  of  the  importance  of check- 
61  ing  at  this  time,  and  in  its  birth,  a  system  which  tends  to  in- 
"  crease  our  political  connections  with  Europe." 

Mr.  Gallatin  was  not  alone  :  Macon,  Nicholas,  and  a  host  of 
others,  associated  with  him,  in  defence  of  principles,  in  their 
-view,  vitally  important  to  the  future  prosperity  of  the  country. 
Far  beyond  the  reach  of  Executive  patronage,  they  boldly  con 
tended  for  a  principle  taught  by  Washington,  and  which  has  since 
been  consecrated  by  the  approving  voice  of  the  People.  Their 
labors  shared  the  fate  which,  in  all  probability,  awaits  the  exertions 
of  those  who,  at  this  day,  maintain  their  doctrines.  They  were 
outmustered  at  roll  call.  They  failed,  mark  it,  by  a  majority  of 
four.  The  force  of  Executive  patronage,  aided  by  a  venal  press, 
was  tot)  strong  for  them.  But  of  what  avail  was  success  to  their 
adversaries  ?  A  few  more  such  victories,  and  their  ruin  was  com 
plete.  The  one  party  succeeded  in  the  House,  but  the  other  out 


35 

of  it.  The  seed  then  sown  took  root.  The  doctrines  of  the  domi 
nant  party,  inherently  unsound,  stood  rebuked  before  the  power 
and  eloquence  of  their  adversaries,  and  speedily  received  the  con 
demnation  of  the  People  ;  whilst  the  opposing  principle,  the  prin 
ciple  for  which  we  now  contend,  was  rescued  from  the  attack  that 
was  made  upon  it,  and  once  more  registered  among  the  special 
canons  of  the  American  policy.  Its  advocates  lived  to  see  it  placed 
upon  a  footing  which  they  had  every  reason  to  believe  would  last, 
at  least,  the  short  period  of  their  existence.  But  how  uncertain 
are  all  things!  "  Let  no  man  boast  of  to-morrow,  for  he  knowetlv 
not  what  a  day  may  bring  forth."  The  events  of  the  last  month 
form  a  striking  commentary  upon  the  text.  It  is  now  twenty- 
eight  years  since  this  transaction  took  place,  and  there  are  yet 
two  persons  on  this  floor  who  acted  and  voted  together  upon  that 
great  question.  It  has  been  to  me  a  matter  of  much  interest  to 
witness  their  course  at  this  day.  Of  the  one  I  cannot  speak,  but 
hope  for  the  best.  The  sentiments  of  the  other  (Mr.  MACON)  are 
on  record.  He  is  yet  the  same  unwavering  Republican  that  he  was 
in  '98.  The  principle  now  involved  is  the  same  as  then.  When 
that  is  ascertained,  he  exhibits  neither  trembling  nor  hesitation, 
With  a  mind  vigorous,  though  mellowed  by  experience,  firmly  re 
lying  on  the  Republic,  he  follows  the  maxims  of  his  early  years. 
The  circumstances  under  which  I  speak  restrains  me.  But  this 
much  I  will  say  :  The  man  who  has  occupied  a  seat  here  and  in 
the  other  House,  during  every  administration  of  the  Government, 
from  the  second  year  of  its  institution  to  the  present  day,  and  who 
has  been  wise  enough  to  estimate,  at  their  value,  the  miserable  illu 
sions  of  Executive  favor,  and  who  prefers  the  approbation  of  his 
own  conscience  to  the  meretricious  smile  of  power  5  who  can  look 
back  upon  a  life  thus  spent,  with  an  entire  consciousness  that  he 
never,  in  a  single  instance,  postponed  the  interests  of  his  consti 
tuents  to  promote  his  own  ;  deserves  to  be  regarded  as  a  monu 
ment  of  fidelity  and  consistency,  alike  honorable  to  his  State,  and 
beneficial  to  his  country.  But  to  return  to  the  circumstances  of 
that  eventful  period  :  The  ball  of  political  revolution,  which  was 
set  in  motion  by  the  debate  on  the  Berlin  Mission,  was  pressed  ra 
pidly  forward  by  successive  measures  of  equally  exceptionable 
character,  until  finally  it  effected  the  total  overthrow  of  the  party 
then  in  power,  and  the  elevation  of  Mr.  Jefferson  to  the  Presi 
dential  chair.  The  creed  of  this  great  father  of  our  political 
church,  was,  "  Peace,  commerce,  and  honest  friendship  with  all 
nations  ;  entangling  alliances  with  none  :"  In  strict  conformity  to 
the  principle  of  Washington,  advising  an  "extension  of  our  com- 
"  mercial  relations,  but  as  little  political  connection  as  possi- 
"  ble.  So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them 
"  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith  ;  but  here  let  us  stop  /" 


36 

During  the  whole  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  administration,  the  whole 
of  Mi.  Madi sow's,  and  the  first  four  years  of  Mr.  Monroe's, 
(with  a  single  attempted  exception,)  the  principles  avowed  by 
the  two  great  founders  of  the  Republic  were  respected,  and 
the  result  was  good.  The  exception  to  which  I  allude  was 
this  :  Influenced  by  that  deep  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of 
our  Western  brethren,  which  always  has,  and  I  trust  always 
will,  influence  the  councils  of  the  country,  the  Government  was,  in 
1803,  induced  to  offer,  through  Mr.  Pinckney,  our  Minister  at  Mad 
rid,  "  to  guaranty  to  the  King  of  Spain,  and  his  successors,  his 
dominions  beyond  the  Mississippi,"  if  he  would  sell  to  the  United 
States  his  possession  between  that  and  the  river  Mobile.  The 
desire  to  obtiin  the  cession,  it  is  well  known,  grew  out  of  the  dis- 
jfate  relative  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  ques 
tions  connected  therewith.  In  the  discussion  with  our  Govern 
ment,  in  1818.  relative  to  the  cession  of  the  Floridas,  Spain  brought 
forward  that  offer  in  1803,  claiming  that  it  proposed  a  guarantee 
of  her  territory  as  far  as  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  desiring  to 
make  it  a  condition  of  the  cession.  The  change  of  circumstances 
since  produced  in  Spanish  America,  had  taught  her  the  immense 
value  of  the  guarantee.  Our  Minister  at  Madrid  (Mr.  Ervine,) 
denied  that  such  an  offer  had  ever  been  made.  Mr.  Pinckney's 
letter  was  produced.  A  controversy  succeeded  as  to  its  construc 
tion  ;  which  resulted  in  an  explicit  declaration  that,  under  no  cir 
cumstances,  would  the  United  States  make  the  guarantee  in  ques 
tion.  The  altered  state  of  things  had  shewn  that  a  stipulation, 
from  which  no  harm  was  apprehended  in  1800.  could  not,  in  1818, 
be  limned  to  for  a  moment.  By  sheer  good  fortune  we  escaped 
from  this  entangling  connexion.  What,  sir,  would  have  been  the 
probable  consequences,  if  Spain  had  accepted  the  guarantee  which 
was  claimed  to  have  been  offered  ?  Instead  of  being  the  great  pa 
tron  of  the  Spanish  American  cause,  we  might,  at  this  moment, 
nave  been  engaged  in  a  war,  either  with  Mexico,  for  attempting  to 
fulfil,  or  with  Spain,  for  violating  our  guarantee  ;  and  yet,  with  all 
the  lights  of  experience  before  our  eyes,  it  is  desired  to  hurry  us 
into  similar  compacts,  the  consequences  of  which  we  cannot,  fore 
see,  but  which  we  well  know  may,  by  the  course  of  events,  com 
pel  us  either  to  violate  our  plighted  faith,  or  act  against  what  may 
hereafter  appear  to  be  our  best  interests. 

Our  next  attempt  to  form  a  foreign  connexion,  other  than  com 
mercial,  was  the  negotiation  of  treaties  of  concert  and  co-operation 
with  England  and  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  on  the  subject  of  the 
Slave  Trade.  A  brief  sketch  of  the  course  and  consequences  of 
that  ill-judged  measure,  will  not  be  without  instruction  upon  the 
subject  before  us.  From  1794  to  1808,  when  the  constitutional 
inhibition  upon  Congress  in  relation  to  the  slave  trade  expired,  a 


37 

system  of  wise,  and,  as  far  as  the  power  of  the  Government  ex 
tended,  efficient  legislation,  was  adopted  for  the  suppression  of  that 
detestable  traffic.  From  the  latter  period  to  the  year  1819,  our  le 
gislation  assumed  a  wider  range,  and  still  more  efficient  character, 
iin'.il,  finally,  the  off-nee  was  denounced  as  piracy,  the  punish 
ment  due  to  that  crime  prescribed,  and  the  Executive  clothed  with 
power  and  means  fully  adequate  to  the  execution  of  the  law  and 
the  suppression  of  the  trade  ;  so  far  at  least  as  our  citizens  were 
concerned.  The  measures  then  adopted,  effected  the  purpose  for 
which  they  were  designed.  They  did  more.  The)'  extorted  from 
England,  who,  next  to  the  United  states,  has  recently  been  fore- 
mi  st  in  the  adoption  of  means  to  this  end,  the  unqualified  admis 
sion,  not  only  that  the  United  States  had  been  the  first,  but  also 
the  most  successful,  laborers  in  the  cause  of  humanity. 

Thus  matters  stood  at  the  period  which  I  have  mentioned. 
Our  Government,  unfortunately  not  content  with  well,  must  seek 
for  b€ttery  and  the  negotiations  of  which  I  speak  were  opened.  So 
too  with  our  affairs  with  the  Spanish  American  States  ;  they  stand 
well;  we  have  done  ail  they  expected  of  us,  and  more  than  they 
had  a  right  to  ask.  What  we  have  done,  has  reflected  credit  upon, 
us,  and  has  been  serviceable  to  them.  Not  content  with  this,  we 
are  hurrying  on  in  the  usual  course:  partial  success  is  leading  us 
to  injurious  excess.  But  to  return  :  the  President  negotiated  a 
treaty  with  England,  yielding,  under  certain  modifications,  the  right 
of  search,  and  authorizing  a  foreign  power  to  enforce  our  own  laws 
upon  our  own  citizens.  I  need  not  state  to  this  body  the  fate  of 
that  ill  advised  project.  The  treaty  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  the 
Senate.  A  similar  one  with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  shared  the 
game  fate;  and,  although  the  vote  against  the  English  treaty  was 
small,  so  rapidly  did  the  sentiment  of  opposition  to  the  principle 
increase,  that  the  rejection  of  the  latter  treaty,  at  a  subsequent  ses 
sion,  was  nearly  unanimous.  Who  is  there  now  on  this  floor,  that 
would  give  his  vote  in  favor  of  a  similar  measure?  But  it  seems 
that  the  light  of  experience  has  been  shed  in  vain  upon  this  obsti 
nate  propensity  to  figure  in  the  diplomacy  necessarily  growing  out 
of  foreign  connection.  The  results  of  the  particular  measures  now 
referred  to,  were,  as  we  all  remember,  contention  at  home,  and  dis 
satisfaction  abroad  ;  a  correspondence  with  England,  of  not  the 
mosi  friendly  character,  in  which  long  explanations  were  made  ne 
cessary  of  the  character  of  our  Government,  to  satisfy  other  pow 
ers  that  the  President  was  not  responsible  for  the  act  of  the  Se 
nate.  Explanations  were  made  with  great  ability  by  the  then 
Secretary  of  State,  and  subsequently  enforced  with  equal  ability 
by  the  present  Secretary.  The  matter  was  understood  here,  and 
perhaps  by  the  Governments  to  whom  those  explanations  were 
made  5  but,  to  a  great  part  of  the  world,  it  appeared  that  the  zeal  of 


the  United  States  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  had  abat 
ed.  The  high  character  we  had  acquired,  for  our  early  and  unceas 
ing  labors  in  that  great  cause,  was  not  indeed  destroyed  :  for  that 
could  not  be  easily  effected  ;  but  our  motives  were  exposed  to  mis 
construction,  and  are  now  misrepresented  by  those  who  do  not 
understand  the  structure  of  our  Government.  Such,  sir,  was  the 
consequence  of  this  third  attempt  to  surrender  the  control  of  our 
conduct  in  the  support  of  our  rights,  or  the  discharge  of  our  du 
ties,  to  foreign  association  :  such  the  penalty  of  disregarding  the 
warning  voice  of  Washington— "  never  abandon  our  own  to  stand 
on  foreign  ground."  Such  are  among  the  least  evils  that  have, 
sooner  or  later,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  been  the  consequence  of 
political  connexions  between  different  nations,  at  all  times,  and  in 
all  places.  Permit  me  to  refer  the  Seriate  to  a  transaction  of  the 
same  character  between  other  States.  In  1815,  the  Plenipotentia 
ries  from  the  five  great  European  Powers,  viz:  England,  France, 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  convened  at  Vienna,  declared  to  the 
world  that  they  would  unite  their  means  for  the  effectual  suppres 
sion  of  the  slave  trade.  The  settlement  of  those  means  was  defer 
red  to  a  future  period  At  the  conference  of  the  Plenipotentiaries 
of  the  same  Powers,  in  1818,  at  Aix  la  Chapelle,  an  attempt  was 
made  to  agree  upon  the  means  necessary  to  effect  their  declared 
object.  Then  occurred,  what  always  will  occur,  except  in  cases 
of  great  emergency — like  the  recent  coalitions  among  the  Powers 
of  Europe  against  that  of  Napoleon,  when  the  very  existence  of 
several  of  the  allied  powers,  was  involved — the  difficulty  of  agree 
ing  upon  the  terms  of  co-operation  among  nations  having  different 
interests,  feelings,  prejudices,  and  views.  England  proposed  the 
extension  of  the  right  of  search,  as  the  only  means  adapted  to  the 
end.  Negotiation  was  commenced  and  continued,  until,  finally, 
the  measure  proposed  by  England  was  refused,  or  evaded,  by  all 
the  Powers,  and  the  conference  dissolved,  leaving  the  celebrated 
declaration  made  at  Vienna  unexecuted,  and  producing  naught 
but  mutual  distrust  and  dissatisfaction.  Thus  shewing  how  easy 
it  is  for  nations  to  unite  in  the  avowal  of  a  general  principle — how 
difficult  to  agree  upon  the  means  of  enforcing  it.  So  will  it  be 
with  us  and  our  South  American  friends  and  neighbors.  There 
may  be  little  difficulty  in  uniting  in  avowing  as  a  principle,  that 
these  continents  are  no  longer  fit  subjects  for  European  coloni 
zation,  or  to  protest  against  the  interference  of  Europe  in  the 
affairs  of  Spanish  America.  But  the  moment  we  proceed  to  stipu 
late  as  to  the  means  of  enforcing  it,  difficulties  will  occur  that,  in 
all  human  probability,  will  impair  the  friendly  relations  now  ex 
isting  between  us.  They  will  occur  first  in  the  negotiation,  and, 
if  these  are  surmounted,  certainly  in  the  application  of  the  principles 
established,  when  the  time  for  their  application  unhappily  occursi 


39 

But  I  cannot  consent  to  trespass  longer  upon  the  time  of  the  Se 
nate  in  pushing  the  discussion  of  this  point  further,  although  vari 
ous  considerations,  operating  against  the  measure,  press  upon  my 
mind.  If  it  were  proposed  to  form  a  connection  with  any  Euro 
pean  Power,  such  as  now  designed  with  the  Spanish  American 
States,  it  is  hoped  and  believed,  that  the  measure  would  not  meet 
with  one  approving  voice — shall  I  say — on  this  floor?  No,  not  in. 
the  country. — But  it  has  been  supposed  that  the  United  States 
ought  to  pursue  a  different  policy  with,  respect  to  the  States  in  this 
hemisphere.  It  is  true,  Mr.  Monroe  in  his  message,  makes  a  dis 
tinction  of  this  character,  although  he  by  no  means  carries  it  to  the 
extent  proposed.  If  he  did,  all  that  the  distinction  could  derive 
from  that  circumstance,  would  be  the  weight  of  his  opinion,  always 
considerable,  but  never  decisive.  The  question  still  recurs,  is  the 
distinction  founded  in  principle  and  policy?  If  it  be,  it  must  arise 
from  one  of  two  reasons  :  either  the  character  of  the  Governments 
of  the  Spanish  American  States,  or  their  local  situation;  or,  per 
haps,  from  both.  The  United  States  have  hailed  the  emancipation 
of  those  States  with  satisfaction  ;  they  have  our  best  wishes  for  the 
perpetuity  of  their  freedom.  So  far  as  we  could  go  to  aid  them  in 
the  establishment  of  their  independence,  without  endangering  the 
peace,  or  embarrassing  the  relations  of  our  country,  we  have  gone. 
More  than  that  ought  not  to  be  asked.  Nor  has  it.  Sensible  of 
the  embarrassments  which  their  invitation  might  produce,  they  de 
clined  to  proffer  it  until  advised  that  we  desired  to  receive  it.  Next 
to  being  right,  it  is  important  to  Governments,  as  well  as  indivi 
duals,  to  be  consistent.  Has  the  character  of  these  Governments 
been  the  principle  upon  which  we  have  hitherto  acted  in  relation  to 
those  States  r  It  has  not.  Mexico  and  Brazil  were  the  last  to  shake 
off  their  dependence  on  foreign  authority.  They  were  among  the 
first  whose  independence  we  acknowledged.  Mexico  was,  at  the 
period  of  its  acknowledgment,  under  the  dominion  of  the  Emperor 
Iturbide,  and  Brazil,  of  its  Emperor,  Don  Pedro.  As  a  special 
compliment  to  the  Emperor  of  Mexico,  we  sent,  or  rather  in 
tended  to  send  to  his  Courtt  one  of  the  most  distinguished  men 
of  the  nation,  (General  JACKSON.)  At  the  Court  of  the  Empe 
ror  Don  Pedro,  we  have  our  Minister;  whilst  in  the  Republic 
of  Peru — the  Power  with  which  the  first  of  the  treaties,  in  virtue  of 
which  the  Congress  of  Panama  is  to  be  held,  was  concluded— we 
have  not  yet  been  represented.  Do  our  principles  admit  that  we 
should  adopt  the  measure  proposed  with  such  reference,  and  upon 
such  grounds  ?  What  are  those  principles  ?  That  man  is  capable  of 
self-government ;  that  the  People  of  every  country  should  be  left  to 
the  free  selection  of  such  form  of  Government  as  they  think  best  ad 
apted  to  their  situation,  and  to  change  it  as  their  interests,  intheir  own 
judgments) may  seem  to  require.  Wherein  consists  our  objections  to 


40 

the  Holy  Alliance  ?  Because  they  confederate  to  maintain  Govern 
ments  similar  to  their  own  by  force  of  arms,  instead  of  the  force  of  rea 
son,  and  the  will  of  the  governed.  If  we,  too,  confederate  to  sustam,by 
the  same  means,  Governments  similar  to  our  own,  wherein  consists 
the  difference,  except  the  superiority  of  our  cause  ?  What  is  their 
avowed  motive  ?  Self  preservation  and  the  peace  of  Europe.  What 
would  be  ours  ?  Self  preservation  and  the  peace  of  America*  I  wish 
to  be  understood.  I  detest  as  much  as  any  man,  the  principles  uf 
the  Holy  Alliance.  I  yield  to  no  man  in  my  anxious  wishes  for  the 
success  of  the  Spanish'American  States.  I  will  go  as  far  as  I  think 
any  American  citizen  ought  to  go,  to  secure  to  them  the  blessings 
of  free  Government.  I  commend  the  solicitude  which  has  been 
manifested  by  our  Government  upon  this  subject,  and  have,  of 
course,  no  desire  to  discourage  it.  But  I  am  against  all  alliances, 
against  all  armed  confederacies,  or  confederacies  of  any  sort.  I 
care  not  how  specious,  or  how  disguised  ;  come  in  what  shape  they 
may,  T  oppose  them.  The  States  in  question  huve  the  power  and 
the  means,  if  united  and  true  to  their  principles,  to  resist  any  force 
that  Europe  can  send  against  them.  It  is  only  by  being  recreant 
to  the  principles  upon  which  their  Revolution  is  founded  ;  by  suffer 
ing  foreign  influence  to  district  and  divide  them  ;  that  their  inde 
pendence  can  be  endangered.  But,  happen  what  may,  our  course 
should  be  left  to  our  choice,  whenever  occasion  for  acting  shall 
occur.  If,  in  the  course  of  events,  designs  shall  be  manifested,  or 
steps  taken  in  this  hemisphere  by  any  foreign  Power,  which  so  far 
affect  our  interest  or  our  honor,  as  to  make  it  necessary  that  we 
should  arm  in  their  defence,  it  will  be  done :  there  is  no  room  to 
doubt  it. 

The  decision  of  that  question  may  safely  be  left  to  those  who 
come  after  us.  That  love  of  country  and  of  freedom  which  now 
animates  our  public  councils,  is  nut  confined  to  us,  or  likely  to  be 
come  extinct.  Wre  require  neither  alliance  nor  agreement  to  com 
pel  us  to  perform  whatever  our  duty  enjoins.  Our  national  charac 
ter  is  our  best  and  should  be  our  only  pledge.  Meanwhile,  let  us 
bestow  upon  our  neighbors,  the  young  Republics  of  the  South,  the 
moral  aid  of  a  good  example.  To  make  that  example  more  salu 
tary,  let  it  exhibit  our  moderation  in  success,  our  firmness  in  ad 
versity,  our  devotion  to  our  country  and  its  institutions,  and  .above 
all,  that  sine  qua  non  to  the  existence  of  our  Republican  Govern 
ment — our  fidelity  to  a  written  Constitution. 

The  local  situation  of  the  States  in  question  does  not  alter  the 
principle,  but  only  bears  upon  the  expediency  of  the  measure.  What 
is  the  reason  why  foreign  connections  were  deprecated  by  Wash 
ington,  and  have,  since  his  day,  been  avoided  by  our  country? 
It  is  because,  between  foreign  Governments  and  our  own,  there  are 
diversities  in  situation,  interest,  feeling,  prejudice,  and  views,  which 


41 

preclude  the  probability  of  preservingthe  relations  we  may  form  with 
them,  and  greatly  increase  the  contingencies  by  which  our  country 
may  become  involved  with  others.  Apply  this  reason  to  the  Govern 
ments  of  New  Spain.  Wherein  consists  the  similarity  between  our 
condition  and  theirs,  except  that  we  are  both  in  this  hemisphere,  and 
that, at  this  time,most  of  them  have  Republican  forms  of  Government, 
but  with  powers  very  different  from  ours.  We  are  unlike  in  all 
other  things.  The  difference  between  us  is  infinitely  greater,  and 
the  intercourse  less  and  more  difficult,  than  between  us  and  several 
of  the  States  of  Europe.  Recent  circumstances  have  increased  the 
danger  of  political  connection,  in  the  form  of  alliances,  of  any  sort, 
with  them.  The  supposed  pacific  views  of  the  Emperor  Alexander 
afforded  the  strongest  security  against  the  interference  of  the  Pow 
ers  of  Europe  in  their  affairs.  His  death  has  certainly  involved 
that  matter  in  doubt  and  difficulty.  The  commencement  of  the 
war  between  Brazil  and  Buenos  Ay  res,  ascertained  since  this  sub 
ject  has  been  before  us,  has  multiplied  greatly  the  danger  of  the 
step,  and  should  induce  us  to  pause  while  the  matter  is  yet  subject 
to  our  control.  Although  we  have  not  before  us  the  treaty  between 
Colombia  «it^l  Buenos  Ayres,  it  is  understood  that  a  similar  one  to 
those  we  have,  has  been  entered  into  between  those  Powtrs.  If  so, 
if  the  confederation  is  so  far  completed,  then  will  the  other  Span 
ish  American  States  be- bound  to  make  common  cause  with  Buenos 
Ayres  in  the  war  with  Brazil.  The  Emperor  Don  Pedro  is  the 
lawful  successor  to  the  throne  of  Portugal;  the  territory  of  Brazil 
is  guarantied  by  Portugal,  and  that  of  Portugal  by  England.  If 
such  is  the  case — and  so,  speaking  from  general  recollection,  I  un 
derstand  the  facts  to  be — how  very  probable  is  it  that  the  casus 
fcederis,  the  interference  of  any  European  Power  with  the  affairs  of 
Spanish  America,  will  soon  occur — upon  the  happening  of  which,  we 
are  to  plunge  this,  now  free  and  happy  country,  the  object  of  the 
envy  and  the  admiration  of  the  world,  into  war  for  the  protection, 
of  the  interests  of  our  neighbors,  and  to  testify,  at  this  late  day,  our 
devotion  to  free  principle*.  Sir,  our  good  fortune  may  guide  us  in 
safety  through  these  difficulties.  I  hope  it  may  be  so — but  my 
fears  are  stronger  than  my  hopes.  I  pray  to  Heaven  that  those 
fears  may  never  be  realized  ;  that  those  who  now  move  Heaven 
and  Earth  to  press  this  ill-omened  measure  to  its  consummation, 
may  never  have  occasion  to  rue  the  day  of  its  adoption. 


mm  —---,-...»»  MM 

Binder 
Gaylord  Bros.      9 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
PAT.  JAN  21,  1908 


